RUB » Department of Philosophy » Philosophy of Language and Cognition

Dr. James Openshaw

Postdoctoral Research Fellow (FOR 2812)
Chair of Philosophy of Language and Cognition, Ruhr University Bochum

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellow
Center for Philosophy of Memory, University of Grenoble-Alpes

Department of Philosophy II
Ruhr University Bochum
Room GA 04/46
44780 Bochum, Germany

Phone number: +49 234-32-24682
Email address:

Student office hours during the lecture period: Wednesdays, 14:15-15:00. Since I'm sometimes based in Grenoble (France), please email in advance in case we need to meet via Zoom.


I joined the university in November 2022 as a postdoctoral researcher on project P3 of the DFG research group 'Constructing Scenarios of the Past' (FOR 2812).

I'm also a Marie SkÅ‚odowska-Curie Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of Memory (Université Grenoble Alpes), where I lead the EU-funded Remembering Objects (2021–24) project.

My principal interests are in the philosophy of mind, but these have often take me into epistemology, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics. My work primarily explores interactions between singular thought (or reference), memory, and perceptual experience. I received my DPhil (PhD) in Philosophy from the University of Oxford in August 2018.

Personal homepage.


  • Openshaw, J. forthcoming. '(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?', Philosophical Perspectives.
  • Openshaw, J. forthcoming. 'Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?', Inquiry. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2155871.
  • Openshaw, J. 2022. 'Remembering objects', Philosophers' Imprint 22(11): 1–20.
  • Openshaw, J., & Weksler, A. 2022. 'Perceptual capacitism: An argument for disjunctive disunity', Philosophical Studies 179: 3325–3348.
  • Openshaw, J. 2021. 'Thinking about many', Synthese 199: 2863–2882.
  • Openshaw, J. 2020. 'Self-ascription and the de se', Synthese 197: 2039–2050.
  • Openshaw, J., & Weksler, A. 2020. 'A puzzle about seeing for representationalism', Philosophical Studies 177: 2625–2646.
  • Openshaw, J. 2018. 'Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports', Mind & Language 33(4): 415–437.