How does an adequate theory of social understanding look like? For decades, there was an intense debate between two camps: Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation-Theory (ST). The central claim of TT is that understanding another person essentially relies on a folk-psychological theory. In contrast, ST holds that we understand others by means of simulation (e.g., Goldman 2006), i.e. by “putting oneself in the other's place.” In recent years, however, it has become clear that both positions have significant limitations (Newen & Schlicht 2009; Gallagher 2007). One criticism is that both accounts primarily assume an observational stance towards the other person, where this amounts to an over-intellectualization of social understanding. Gallagher suggested an interaction theory (2001) of social understanding, which combines involvement in interaction with a direct perception thesis (Gallagher 2008), such that we can directly perceive the mental states of others and do not have to infer them. The idea that online interaction with others is constitutive for any process of social understanding is radicalized in the enacted account of social understanding suggested by de Jaegher (2009). This approach underestimates the role of observation and narratives as an important source of social understanding. In contrast, Hutto's narrative account of social understanding takes narratives to be essential for social understanding (Hutto 2008). All these accounts have two main deficits: first, they radicalize a single approach of social understanding. The much more plausible view is that humans rely on a multiplicity of epistemic methods of social understanding (Fiebich 2015; Newen 2015). Secondly, the approaches do not adequately account for the obvious difference between understanding a friend vs. a complete stranger. One recent theory which attempts to avoid these two problems, is the person model theory (Newen & Schlicht 2009; Newen 2015). The central claim of this theory is that we organize our prior knowledge used to understand others in person models. A person model is a unity of properties or features, which we represent in memory as belonging to one person or a group (resp. type) of persons. It is suggested that there are two types of person models in use: implicit person models, which are called “person schemata” and which are developed very early in life; and explicit person models, which are called “person images” and develop parallel to the ability of explicit mindreading (of attributing beliefs or other attitudes). The task of this project is to work out the role of online social interaction in a full-blown theory of social understanding. The leading question is to which extent social understanding is enacted, i.e. dependent on online interaction. One working hypothesis could be that the person model theory has to be modified into an account of situated and dynamic models of persons (person models) and relevant situations (situation models) in social interaction.