Professor emeritus Dr. Hans-Ulrich Hoche

Private mailing addresses

Prof. Dr. Hans-Ulrich Hoche
Emil-Higelin-Str. 15
D-88048 Friedrichshafen

E-mail: ulrich[dot]hoche[at]arcor[dot]de
Phone: ++49(0)7544-9499049

I. Academic data

1932: February 16:  born in Erfurt (Thuringia, Germany).
1949-1951: Academic studies in physics and mathematics, University of Giessen (Germany).
1951-1962: Academic studies in philosophy, comparative religion, and Slavic philology, Universities of Bonn and Cologne. Partly a working student in multifarious jobs, partly sponsored by the German National Academic Foundation.
1962: Dr. phil. [Ph.D.], University of Cologne (adviser: Ludwig Landgrebe).
1962-1965: Lecturer in German and philosophy, University of the Philippines, Quezon City. Sponsored by the German Academic Exchange Service.
1965-1967: Staff member of the German National Academic Foundation, Bonn.
1967-1969: Research grant by the German Research Foundation, University of Göttingen (adviser: Günther Patzig).
1969-1976: Wissenschaftlicher Assistent [assistant professor], University of Bochum (adviser: Günter Gawlick).
1971: Habilitation, University of Bochum.
1973: Apl. Professor [titular professor], University of Bochum.
1976-1980: Universitätsdozent [university lecturer], University of Bochum.
1980-1996: Universitätsprofessor [university professor], University of Bochum.
1991-1993: Dean of the Department of Philosophy, Education, and Journalistic and Communication Studies.
Since 1996: Retired. Continuation of selected teaching and examining activities: Linguistico-phenomenological and logico-linguistic colloquia [in co-operation with Werner Strube and Ulrich Pardey / Friedrich Dudda / Tania Eden / Michael Knoop respectively]; supervision of philosophical theses / professorial dissertations.


II. Selected Writings

(see also the complete list of publications)

2014: Some Remarks on Self-Identity and Identity Proper. In: Fait, Benedikt & Zumpf, Daniela (eds.), Identität – Logik – Kritik. Festschrift für Ulrich Pardey zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin und Münster: LIT 2014, pp. 27–52.
2013: In Search of a Purely Noematic Phenomenology. The Complementaristic Approach to Consciousness vs. Husserl’s Method of Transcendental Reduction. In: Uwe Meixner & Rochus Sowa (eds.), The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, Vol. 16), Münster: mentis 2013, pp. 15–48.
2012: Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects [together with Michael Knoop]. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (forthcoming).
2011: Die Universalisierte Goldene Regel als Grundlage einer kulturübergreifenden Moral und Moralerziehung [The Universalized Golden Rule as a basis for an intercultural morality and moral education]. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 19 (2011), pp. 471–500.
2010a: Logical Relations Between Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the Two Golden Rules [together with Michael Knoop]. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 18 (2010), pp. 483-518.
2010b: Ascriptions of &ls-quo;Propositional Attitudes’. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. (Ready for print.)
2009: Peter Bieri über die Zukunft der analytischen Philosophie. Eine unerlässliche Entgegnung [Peter Bieri on the future of analytic philosophy. An indispensable retort]. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 17 (2009), pp. 415-444
2008a: Anthropological Complementarism. Linguistic, Logical, and Phenomenological Studies in Support of a Third Way Beyond Dualism and Monism. Paderborn: mentis 2008.
2008b: The Conception of Anthropological Complementarism. An Introduction [≅ 2008a: Introduction]. In: CogPrints Cognitive Sciences E-Print Archive 2008 (
2008c: The Two Complementary Perspectives on the Body-Mind-World Problem and on Human Action [≅ 2008a: Essay VI].  In: e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie No. 11, 2008 (
2007: Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans’s reflexive model of consciousness. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007), pp. 389–409. [Also in: CogPrints Cognitive Sciences E-Print Archive 2006 (].
2004: In Search of an Integrated Logic of Conviction and Intention. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 12 (2004), pp. 401–434. [Also in: CogPrints Cognitive Sciences E-Print Archive 2006 (].
2002: Philosophieren [Philosophising]. In: Th. Spitzley & R. Stoecker (eds.), Philosophie à la carte, Paderborn: mentis 2002, pp. 153–156.
2001: Eine wollenslogische Weiterentwicklung des Universellen Präskriptivismus und die Begründung der Goldenen Regel [A further development of universal prescriptivism by means of a logic of willing, and a proof of the golden rule]. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 9 (2001), pp. 325–376.
1995a: Do Illocutionary, or Neustic, Negations Exist? In: Erkenntnis 43 (1995), pp. 127–136.
1995b: Anthropologische Komplementarität und die ‚Einheit der Sache‘. Versuch einer skeptischen Lösung eines skeptischen Zweifels [Anthropological complementarity and the ‘unity of the object’. An attempt to provide a sceptical solution for a sceptical doubt]. In: L. Kreimendahl (ed.), Aufklärung und Skepsis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Festschrift for Günter Gawlick), Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 107–129.
1995c: Universal Prescriptivism Revised; or: The Analyticity of the Golden Rule. In: Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 4 (No 8, Oktober 1995), pp. 337–363.
1992: Elemente einer Anatomie der Verpflichtung. Pragmatisch-wollenslogische Grundlegung einer Theorie des moralischen Argumentierens [Elements of an anatomy of obligation. Groundwork of a theory of moral reasoning, based on pragmatics and a logic of willing]. Freiburg / Munich: Alber 1992.
1990: Einführung in das sprachanalytische Philosophieren [Introduction to doing philosophy in a linguistic key]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1990.
1987: Das Leib-Seele-Problem: Dualismus, Monismus, Perspektivismus [The mind-body problem: dualism, monism, perspectivism]. In: Philosophia Naturalis 24 (1987), pp. 218–236.
1986: Subjektivität [Subjectivity]. In: J. Kirchberg & J. Müther (eds.), Philosophisch-Theologische Grenzfragen (Festschrift for Richard Schaeffler), Essen: Ludgerus, pp. 51–63.
1985a: Sein und Heißen. Modalprobleme der Identität [Being, and being called. Modal problems of identity]. In: Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science 16 (1985), pp.287–303.
1985b: Analytische Philosophie [Analytical philosophy](in co-operation with Werner Strube). Freiburg / Munich: Alber 1985 (= Handbuch Philosophie, ed. by E. Ströker & W. Wieland, Vol. 6).
1983a: Zur logischen Struktur von ‚Goldene-Regel‘-Argumenten im Sinne Hares [The logical structure of Hare’s Golden-Rule Arguments]. In: Kant-Studien 74 (1983), pp. 453–478.
1983b: Philosophisches Staunen und phänomenologische Variation [Philosophical amazement and phenomenological variation]. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983), pp. 283–305.
1982: Beziehungen zwischen der Semantik Freges und der Noematik Husserls [Relations between Frege’s semantics and Husserl’s noematics]. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64 (1982), pp. 166–197.
1981: Zur Methodologie von Kombinationstests in der analytischen Philosophie [The methodology of combination tests in linguistic philosophy]. In: Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science 12 (1981), pp. 28–54.
1979: Dient Goodmans ‚grue‘ seinem Zweck? / Does Goodman’s ‚grue‘ Serve Its Purpose? (tr. by G. Shaw). In: Ratio 21 (1979), pp. 162–173 (English edition); pp. 162–172 (German edition).
1978: Die Goldene Regel. Neue Aspekte eines alten Moralprinzips [The golden rule. New aspects of an old moral principle]. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 32 (1978), pp. 355–375.
1977: Kausalgefüge, irreale Bedingungssätze und das Problem der Definierbarkeit von Dispositionsprädikaten [Causal sentences, counterfactual conditionals, and the problem of how to define dispositional predicates]. In: Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science 8 (1977), pp. 257–291.
1973a: Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib. Vorstudien zu einer rein noematischen Phänomenologie [Action, consciousness, and (the functioning) body. Preliminary studies concerning a purely noematic phenomenology]. Freiburg / Munich: 1973.
1973b: Kritische Bemerkungen zu Freges Bedeutungslehre [Some critical remarks on Frege’s theory on sense and reference]. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 27 (1973), pp. 205–221.


III. Research focuses

My research has mainly centred on the following aspects and branches of philosophy:

  1. Methods of philosophising; informal logic.
  2. Metaethics; integrated logic of conviction and intention.
  3. Theory of consciousness; mind-body problems.
  4. Philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science.
  1. Methods of philosophising; informal logic.
    As I believe that the issue-related attitude of doing philosophy does in fact, and necessarily has to, fundamentally differ from the historical attitude of studying the development and the divergent schools of philosophy, I increasingly considered it important to study, as thoroughly as possible, the non-empirical methods which characterise an intellectually and socially justifiable form of philosophising in contradistinction to the multifarious, but predominantly empirical methods of the established sciences and humanities (including the history of philosophy). Personally, I found some basic methods of ‘transcendental’ and of ‘linguistic phenomenology’ most promising: My main interests have centered on informal logic, notably on sharpening up the (in my view) stupendously fertile combination or assenting tests which, if more or less rudimentarily, have long since been used by philosophers and which, I think, ought to be decidedly based on respectively my own imaginative and idiolectal competence. [See esp. II: 1981; 1983b; 1985b; 1990; 2002; 2008a: ‚Introduction‘ and Essays I–II; 2008b; 2009.]
  2. Metaethics; integrated logic of conviction and intention.
    Of the methods specified in (1) I availed myself, first, in logically analysing the concept of moral obligation (‘morally ought’) and the formal proof, based thereon, that the old (to wit: ancient Greek) moral principle of the ‘universalised golden rule’ is an analytical truth. To achieve this end, I had to devise an integrated logic of believing and intending (doxastico-theletic logic) which in some respects considerably diverges from established deontic and epistemic logics. [See esp. II: 1978; 1983a; 1992; 1995c; 2001; 2004; 2010; 2011.]
  3. Theory of consciousness; mind-body problems.
    Of the methods specified in (1) I availed myself, second, in analysing the logical structure of ordinary-language identity-statements and, subsequently, clarifying the conception of a form of non-identity which is not numerical but (as I suggest to call it) ‘categorial’. In the case of the intricate relationship between given segments of subjectively experienced consciousness and given segments of objectively observable neural (and other bodily) activities, this highly momentous, if mostly overlooked, form of non-identity takes the special shape of a strict ‘complementarity’ in much the sense of Niels Bohr’s, which, in my opinion, must by no means at all be misinterpreted as a ‘dual-aspect’ view. [See esp. II: 1973a; 1986; 1987; 1990: Ch. 11; 1995b; 2007; 2008a: Essays III–VI; 2008c; 2013.]
  4. Philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science.
    Rather as by-products of my teaching and examining activities as well as the researches mentioned in (1) through (3), I also published a few papers in, and between, the fields of philosophical logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science. [See esp. II: 1973b; 1977; 1979; 1982; 1985a; 1995a; 2012; 2013; 2014.]


IV. Current research projects

Presently (Spring 2015), Michael Knoop and I are preparing a potential collection of logical studies.