Connexivist Elements in Hegel’s Logic

ELENA FICARA
UNIVERSITÄT PADERBORN, GERMANY

In my paper I highlight some connexivist elements in Hegel’s logic. I give an account of dialectical inferences based on Hegel’s Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, a text of extreme importance if one wishes to integrate Hegel into the canon of the history of logic. In the Lectures Hegel presents his own view on what he calls “genuine dialectic” in the context of a discussion of Zeno’s practice of refutation, Megarian paradoxes and both Plato’s and Aristotle’s dialectic. In these discussions new formal aspects of dialectical inferences emerge, aspects that are normally overlooked.

First, in Hegelian dialectical inferences are involved sentences of the form $A \rightarrow \neg A$ and $\neg A \rightarrow A$. In a classical setting, the conditional is admissible and from $A \rightarrow \neg A$ we can, by consequentia mirabilis (CM), derive $\neg A$, and from $\neg A \rightarrow A$ by CM infer $A$. However, in Hegel’s analysis it is evident that neither can we infer $A$ from $\neg A \rightarrow A$, nor $\neg A$ from $A \rightarrow \neg A$, and thus, analogously to connexivist accounts, CM fails.

Second, the contradiction conveyed in dialectical inferences is a conjunction of contradictories for which simplification fails. Thus Hegel, like connexivists, rejects:

$$(A \land \neg A) \rightarrow A$$

My paper has three parts. In the first I present the elements in dialectical inferences that call for a possible connexivist reading. In the second I consider the Hegelian motivations for endorsing these elements, comparing them with the ones normally provided by connexivists. In the last part I show how in Hegel’s logic these elements coexist with features that are normally rejected by connexivists.