Diese fortlaufende Berichterstattung sucht das nicht selbständig erschienene Schrifttum über Hegel, also Abhandlungen aus Zeitschriften, Sammelbänden usw. möglichst breit zu erfassen und durch kurze Inhaltsreferate bekanntzumachen. Sofern Abhandlungen bereits mit Inhaltsreferaten versehen sind, werden diese hier übernommen.

Neu erschienene Bände des Hegel-Jahrbuchs werden in der Abteilung Literaturberichte und Kritik als ganze rezensiert; gleiches gilt für Sammelbände sowie Periodika-Sondernummern, die ausschließlich der Philosophie Hegels gewidmet sind. In der Bibliographie werden die einzelnen Abhandlungen solcher Bände nicht mehr angezeigt.


Für diesen Band haben Berichte verfasst oder bearbeitet: Erzsébet Rózsa (Debrecen) und Holger Glinka vom Hegel-Archiv (Bochum).

Die über Hegel arbeitenden Autoren sind freundlich eingeladen, durch Einsendung von Sonderdrucken die Berichterstattung zu erleichtern. Allen, die solche Hilfe bisher schon geleistet haben, sei besonders gedankt.
I will start with a poem, which I intend to tie up to this poem firstly in response to one of my frequent lamentations concerning the lack of imagination common to most of us and secondly of Kant for the lead he gave the Romantic Idealist by refusing the possibility of knowing the realm of physical noumena. I have since regretted that, I do not do a good job of defending my criticism of the transcendental philosophy, confining myself rather to pointing out some of the unfortunate consequences of that approach, as rendered explicit in the evil of H.s teaching. I would take the opportunity offered by this article to amend this failing by offering an internal criticism of the conception of knowledge on which the transcendental philosophy apparently rests. I will try to bring out the connection with the poem.


In this paper I focus on the theory of the popular sovereignty and the ephorate expounded by Fichte in his Foundations of Natural Right of 1796/97. In the first place, I expound the foundation of the principle of right and of the state, in order to understand the necessity of the popular control of the government. Finally, I reconstruct and evaluate H.s critic of Fichte’s theory in his writing of 1802 about the natural right.


Bancaud, Florence: The aesthetics of ugliness from Hegel to Rosenkranz’ “aesthetics of resistance” or of resignation to the “arts that are not more beautiful?” — In: Études Germaniques. Paris. 64 (2009), 4, 899–917.


How can the new technology of information associated with new settings of press freedom and the phenomenon of public opinion contradiction in the Internet era accomplish the mediation of
the opinion in a globalized society? Or still, starting from the assumption of press freedom, how to ensure that society will solve the contradiction of the public opinion? The phenomenon of public opinion is conflicting because it has in itself, at the same time, the universality of constitutional principles of law and ethics, and the peculiarity of the citizens’ rights and concerns. This contradiction finds its solution through mediation of press freedom within a frame of democratic legality. This is the power of the contradiction: to make effective the mediation of the dialectic tension between the opposite poles of the universal and the singular in the press freedom, ensuring the right of every citizen to express publicly his opinion. This is H.s theory of public opinion: the press freedom and the congress, while political space, are privileged spheres of mediation of the contradictory phenomenon of public opinion.


Criticism of H. has been a central preoccupation of „postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian „archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that H.s invocation of „absolute knowledge” installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God-like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage’s perfect wisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since H.s construction of the role of the Sage possessing absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which it becomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores H.s commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of a new method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likely place of all, his portrait of „absolute knowledge.”


In examining H.s and Kierkegaard’s theories of language, I argue that both entail conceptions of the therapeutic power of language to heal us from madness and despair. I show that whereas H. quite straightforwardly celebrates the emancipatory power of language, Kierkegaard is more ambivalent; on the one hand, he devotes his life to a maieutic authorship in service of aiding the reader, but on the other, he believes that ultimately it is only faith in God that can cure us, and that faith requires silence. I use Lacan’s psychoanalytic account of the role of language to explore H.s view that language constitutes the self and Kierkegaard’s experimentation with an indirect form of communication that he hopes will enable him to fulfill each of his apparently conflicting goals, to write and yet to remain silent.

If one wants to determine the relationship between ordinary life and art one has to start with the groundbreaking Kantian insight that the beautiful reflects the working of the human faculties of the understanding. However, I argue that the Kantian conception of aesthetic reflection is not satisfying, for Kant does not succeed in explaining the objective purport of the aesthetic reflection. I resort to H. to resolve this problem. But his explanation, too, falls short of grasping the multiplicity of ways in which works of art make a contribution to a self-determined way of life. However, in H. there is a hint how to deal with this problem: Reflection has to be understood as practical and not as cognitive. A conception of aesthetic reflexivity in terms of practical self-determination allows grasping that there is no gap between ordinary life and art.


This paper seeks to present a map of the influences of ancient scepticism on modern dialectical philosophy – something which, after Kant, mainly takes place in H.s writings – furnishing a succinct description of the way in which that influence made itself felt.


This paper argues that H.s depiction of knowledge, as presented in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective Spirit, is founded on what he deems to be the practical interests of self-consciousness. More specifically, it highlights the significance of the will in H.s understanding of the cognitive process. I begin with a survey of the relation between category-formation and the notion of self-determining freedom in the Logic, and therewith draw attention to the unity of thinking and
willing in the Concept. I then indicate how H.s philosophy of subjective Spirit should be read as the applied logic of the Concept, according to which the socially constituted self-conscious I seeks to realise its claims to freedom through its theoretical cognitions of objects. As part of what could be called H.s integrative theory of the faculties, I finally argue that the will underscores both the determinate character of our theoretical cognitions and the reflexivity of knowledge in general. On this score, I maintain that H., whose relation to Kant and Fichte I also consider, is of the view that it is with reference to willing that we can account for the self-referential nature of reason in toto as the actualised unity of theoretical-practical subjectivity.


This paper has two related goals. Firstly, after briefly clarifying the theoretical core of Solger’s thought, it will analyse his metaphysics from H.s point of view, emphasizing that sacrifice is, for Solger, the fundamental structure of the relationship between the finite and the Infinite. Secondly, it will investigate the main reasons behind H.s criticism of Solger, showing that they have different conceptions of privation and negation and concluding that Solger and H. have different aims. H.s aim consists in recomposing the unity of finite and infinite, whereas Solger’s thought is structured on the rupture between these two.


In this essay, I offer a more critical reading of the “moral perspective” based on an interpretation of H.s views on morality and the modern subject. Although H. is notorious for his enthusiasm in the modern state, which is a strong system through and through, I suggest his view on morality alone allows for a non-systematic understanding of the “moral perspective.” The “moral perspective” is in this reading a moral settlement that pays respect for three kinds of subjective activity, freedom of insight, freedom of choice of pursuits, and ethical will. The need of such moral settlement is only evoked by actual encounters of particular wills when people actualize their internal ends in the external world. One contemporary theory of transnational justice consistent with this critical reading of the “moral perspective” is Iris M. Young’s critical theory of communicative democracy. My reading of moral settlement agrees with her that our transnational causal connections engender moral obligations beyond national boundaries. But Young’s proposal of transnational institutions of justice also reveals the weakness of the „moral perspective” in transnational spheres. She, like most theories of transnational justice who see justice as the first virtue of political institutions, overlooks practicing justice is also one among the sources of our deepest conflicts. In addition to Bernard Yack’s and Judith Shklar’s accounts of our stubborn dispositions associated with justice or injustice, I use H.s insight of the modern subject’s various pathologies while experiencing deep disagreements on justice to elaborate modern subjects’ inherent difficulty in practicing transnational justice. If H.s views on morality and the modern subject are correct, by their understandings of their causal relations and moral responsibilities alone, modern subjects are incapable of achieving consensus on transnational justice through ordinary democratic processes.

The ever-growing body of literature on civil society can benefit from a return to the original theoretical articulation and defense of the concept in the work of H. Specifically, this article suggests that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s influential critique of civil society remains unanswered and argues that H. responded with a sweeping and sympathetic institutional design that remains relevant today. H. agrees with Rousseau that commercial society aggravates the dissatisfaction of its members, and that educating individual desire through institutional design is necessary to solve this difficulty. However, modern states need not adopt Rousseau’s extreme and impracticable solution. H.’s concrete, market-based associations of civil society render desires satiable and elevate them to accord with the common good, while still maintaining the freedom and distinctness of a pluralistic modern society.


The article presents the interpretation of philosopher H. on mutual recognition. It discusses the proper understanding of the account of recognition in Foundations of Natural Right by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which grasps the full meaning of H.’s account on the recognition in the System of Ethical Life. It delineates the argument of Fichte which states that the sciences of right and morality are distinct autonomous disciplines. It cites Fichte’s hypothesis of egoism, his idea on the relationship between right and morality, and his insights on free efficacy. He also claims that recognition can occur only if it is mutual or reciprocal. Neohouser’s arguments on „Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality“ are also presented.


We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the „parity principle“ (see: Clark and Chalmers. – In: Analysis. Oxford. 58 [1998], 1, 7–19), in light of H.’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.


Throughout the twentieth century, critical philosophy has proceeded by confronting a particular position by a criterion that it considered to be contained within itself. This method has been extremely productive. I argue, however, that it relies on a tension between particularity and universality the implications of which have not been sufficiently acknowledged. In order to expose this tension I go back to the roots of this method in modern philosophy, that is, to Kant’s first Critique and H.’s essay entitled „On the Essence of Philosophical Critique as Such and its Relation to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular“ (1802). The fact that Kant and H. drew most divergent criteria from what they considered to be pure reason seems to compromise not merely their universality, but also their alleged immanence in the philosophical systems under critique. Even though the method initiated by Kant and H. is haunted by the tension between particularity and universality, I do not wish to suggest that the idea of immanent critique should be abandoned altogether. Contemporary critical philosophy should rather affirm that paradigms tend to conceive of their own particular principles as universal, and by that very gesture – the essence of ideology – tend to oppose themselves to contrary paradigms.

This essay re-examines H.s account of Greek culture in the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit devoted to „ethical action.“ The thrust of this section cannot be adequately grasped, it is argued, by focusing on H.s references to either Sophocles’ Antigone or Greek tragedy as a whole. Taking into account H.s complex use of literary sources, the essay shows in particular that H. draws on Aristophanes’ comedies to comprehend the collapse of Greek culture, a collapse he considered to result from the tragic conflict constitutive of Greek culture as a whole. The essay thus aims to shed light on H.s abstruse remarks on womanhood and, more generally, to demonstrate that H.s peculiar employment of literary sources constitutes an essential element of the method he employs throughout the Phenomenology of Spirit.


H.s philosophy receives often the objection that in his later phase the central place of recognition that was characteristic in the Jena period has been displaced by an abstract and formal theory of free will. This assert presupposes the identification of recognition with intersubjectivity as interaction of individuals. But there are also other aspects that define from the beginning H.s conception of recognition: Sittlichkeit, struggle, spirit, general will, self-consciousness, reconciliation, formation. I try to demonstrate that the most determinant concept in H.s theory of recognition is the concept of formation, that crosses and threads as a train of thought all other aspects.


Despite the radically different interests that motivate Emil Fackenheim’s and Henry Harris’s respective interpretations of H., the two have significant points of commonality. They in fact come the closest precisely at points where they seem to differ most. The need and the possibility of “reconciliation” is the theme that animates both interpretations, and both also agree in their assessment of H.s treatment of “evil.” There are nevertheless crucial differences separating the two, which the essay details. The essay concludes wondering, on the one hand, how seriously Harris recognizes that, in a post-Holocaust world, ‘reconciliation’ calls for existential conditions such as H. could
never have imagined; and on the other hand, how much Fackenheim would be willing to admit that his immersion into history will necessarily bring violent consequences in train for which there will have to be an accounting.


Given their literary and philosophical achievements, German Romanticism and German Idealism enjoy a good reputation, covering up the political and ideological virulence that its main protagonists – such as Schlegel, H. and Heine – had to face. This article distinguishes between Romantic and Romanticism. Schlegel devised a typology of Romantic art. This European art form, which developed under the preserve of Christianity, gradually lost its sacred character as it became modern Romanticism, well characterized by Heine’s „Romantic School,” is the conversion of this Romantic aesthetic into a medievalizing and conservative ideology in the context of a political culture hostile to German Enlightenment, which was criticized by Heine for historical, political and social reasons, and by H. for philosophical reasons. In terms of philosophy, the Romantic thought criticized by H. was not that of Schlegel but that of Schelling.


The role of mathematics in the development of Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–1995) philosophy of difference as an alternative to the dialectical philosophy determined by the H.ian dialectic logic is demonstrated in this paper by differentiating Deleuze’s interpretation of the problem of the infinitesimal in Difference and Repetition from that which H. presents in the Science of Logic. Each deploys the operation of integration as conceived at different stages in the development of the infinitesimal calculus in his treatment of the problem of the infinitesimal. Against the role that H. assigns to integration as the inverse transformation of differentiation in the development of his dialectical logic, Deleuze strategically redeployed Leibniz’s account of integration as a method of summation in the form of a series in the development of his philosophy of difference. By demonstrating the relation between the differential point of view of the Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus and the differential calculus of contemporary mathematics, I argue that Deleuze effectively bypasses the methods of the differential calculus which H. uses to support the development of the dialectical logic, and by doing so, sets up the critical perspective from which to construct an alternative logic of relations characteristic of a philosophy of difference. The mode of operation of this logic is then demonstrated by drawing upon the mathematical philosophy of Albert Lautman (1908–1944), which plays a significant role in Deleuze’s project of constructing a philosophy of difference. Indeed, the logic of relations that Deleuze constructs is dialectical in the Lautmanian sense.


In this paper I consider Benedetto Croce’s interpretation and critique of H.s dialectic in Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è della filosofia di Hegel (1906) and I compare it with a very similar critique elaborated by Gilles Deleuze around sixty years later (in Difference et répétition [1968], Nietzsche et la philosophie [1962] and Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? [1991]). Even if they are two very different authors, belonging to very different traditions and contexts, both Croce and Deleuze criticise H. with a very similar argument, namely by saying that H. did not adequately take into account the concept of difference, and subordinated it to opposition (or negation). In addition, albeit by taking different roads, both Croce and Deleuze thought that philosophy has its own specific logic, and this logic is a logic of concept.


This article demonstrates that H. and Rushdie are contemporaries, and that the Phenomenology of Spirit and Midnight’s Children are each others counterpart – philosophical and literary, respectively. It shows that the narrative structures of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Midnight’s Children are identical, and both texts culminate in the remembrance of their narrative journeys. It argues that authenticity is constituted by the inauthentic. Recognizing that both texts remain open to the future, this article concludes by urging that India is now the land of the future and that Midnight’s Children is the continuation of the Phenomenology of Spirit.


This article interprets the argumentative strategy of H.s Elements of the Philosophy of Right in light of the three sets of categories Stanley Fish articulates in his Self-Consuming Artifacts: rhetorical and dialectical presentations, self-satisfying and self-consuming artifacts, and self-satisfying and self-consuming epistemologies. Typically, a self-satisfying artifact is presented rhetorically and expresses a self-satisfying epistemology, as a self-consuming artifact is presented dialectically and expresses a self-consuming epistemology. H.s argumentative strategy, however, is a dialectically presented self-consuming artifact that expresses a self-satisfying epistemology. This article has five sections. The first describes Fish’s categories. The second explains H.s rejection of edifying philosophy. The third examines H.s argumentative strategy in the preface to the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The fourth discusses H.s imminent future. The final section suggests that the Sittlichkeit of modernity is, paradoxically, the recognition that Sittlichkeit is impossible.


The article examines the relation between modernity and terrorism, as well as the tension between fidelity to the demands of justice and those of the state’s existential preservation to determine what makes the Terror of the French Revolution so terrible. It elaborates on H.s account of the Terror in his Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit. The significance of H.s account of the Terror for understanding and combating contemporary terrorism is also discussed.


The article analyzes the metaphysical and political component of H.s Philosophy of Right. According to the author, the relationship of metaphysics and politics in H.s political thought has been questioned. The author argues the separability of philosophical form and political in H. He also elaborates that the metaphysical component of H. informs his conception of state. He also highlights the relationship of H.s philosophical project with the conception of the universalist state.


The important H.ian thesis of the integral, and therefore absolute, rationality of being is well known. Hence, it seems useless to speak of a H. of the Logic, for example, as opposed to a H. of politics, of history, of nature, of aesthetics or of the religious. Such „regional“ logics are ultimately reducible to one and the same fundamental structure of sense and that of „the“ sense. This article aims precisely at providing convincing evidence for the hypothesis of the basic intelligibility of the real as residing in the so-called SNRR Gyroscope (or matrix system) subject – negativity – result – reconciliation.


This essay is a consideration of H.s account of the voice. Responding, in the first instance, to Derrida’s discussion of what he terms H.s ‘semiology,’ the article attempts to map out complexities in H.s account of voice that tend to resist absorption into the trajectory that Derrida has outlined. H.s discussion of music in the Aesthetics will be the focus, and an attempt is made to link the emergence of the musical voice to the fundamental determinations of time and of sound in the Philosophy of Nature. Finally, the essay will connect H.s understanding of music with the primordial appearance of voice in the anthropology of the Philosophy of Spirit.

The article focuses on the 1938 trial of Bolshevik philosopher Nikolai Bukharin for conspiracy during the administration of Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union. The trial was considered part of Stalin’s „purges“ of the 1930s, referred to as the Great Terror. The author considers the writings of Bukharin while he spent a year in prison, especially the transcript of his final plea delivered at his trial and his letters to Stalin, and compares it to the diary kept by Russian playwright Aleksandr Afinogenov during the 1930s.


Le présent article porte sur le problème du commencement objectif de la philosophie dans le système de H. Son but est de mettre en évidence les différents textes, en particulier leurs destinataires respectifs, dans lesquels H. pose puis résout ce problème. Dans cette perspective, il se divise en trois parties. Tout d’abord, dans l’Introduction à la première édition de l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques, H. énonce clairement la difficulté d’instituer un commencement en philosophie pour la raison que celui-ci doit être nécessairement un immédiat-médialisé. Il établit ensuite, au début de la Science de la Logique, la non-vérité de l’alternative entre un commencement immédiat et un commencement médiatisé, pour finalement démontrer, dans l’Idée absolue, la nécessité et la vérité d’un commencement de la philosophie à la fois immédiat et médiatisé.


In this paper, I argue against the idea of dealing with H.s philosophy as if it were based on obscure and inexplicable principles that can only be accepted as a fact for which no rational or philosophical explanation is available. In order to do it, I consider the aspect of H.s method which is connected with the concept of contradiction. H.s own conceptions of contradiction and objects can be considered as being in accordance with those postulates which are the results of his criticism of traditional metaphysics. The shortcomings of traditional metaphysics are seen by H. as a consequence of its incautious use of the subject-predicate structure of language which, as he holds, is inappropriate to express something true about objects as they really are; nevertheless, H. is convinced, at the same time, that this way of speaking about objects is unavoidable. H. tries to solve the resulting dilemma by introducing the concept of contradiction as a methodological rule by means of which the deficiencies of traditional metaphysics could be avoided.


In this essay I challenge John McDowell’s controversial claim that „the real topic“ of H.s master/slave dialectic is the relation between „two aspects of the consciousness of a single individual.“ I first consider McDowell’s interpretation of Kant, and then, by analysing briefly H.s account of self-consciousness prior to the master/slave dialectic, I defend the more traditional view that that dialectic describes the relation between two separate individuals. I also criticize McDowell’s conception of absolute knowing, which, as I understand it, underlies his contention that the master/slave dialectic examines the relation between apperceptive spontaneity and empirical consciousness within a single self.
Bibliographie


Brandom’s interpretation of H. in *Tales of the Mighty Dead* is subtle, tightly argued and hugely impressive. It takes no account, however, of H.'s distinctive conception of phenomenology and as a result – for all its subtlety – offers a somewhat distorted picture of H. In the opening chapters of H.'s *Phenomenology* we learn that perception is committed as much to the unity of differences as to exclusive difference, that neither perception nor understanding is committed to holism as Brandom understands it, and that the understanding is not governed by the law of non-contradiction but in fact understands the world to be a thoroughly contradictory place. All of this, however, gets lost sight of in Brandom’s de re interpretation of H.'s *Phenomenology*.


In the concluding subsections of reason, reason becomes moral, and reveals the emptiness of some contemporary Kantian procedures of testing our maxims to see whether they count as moral rules. H. argues that spirit provides the cultural and historical context which enables one to be who one is: there is no ‘I’ without a ‘we’. H. does not simply change the topic, from the ‘I’ of reason to the ‘we’ of spirit; he provides an interpretive explanation of the transition from individual reason which projects itself as universal, to collective spirit, the ‘we’ which makes possible individual forms of reason.


In H.'s philosophy God is “the sole object of philosophy,” in other words, philosophy has to attain in God the complete knowledge, to relate everything to God and to explain everything through God; thus philosophy in essence is a theology and is a worshiping of God. In the context of H.'s philosophy, God is considered to be both the final result and the precondition of philosophy, both its final goal and its starting point. H.'s speculative philosophy has been formed in the context of the dialogue between various philosophical theories. Regarding knowledge about God, H. rejects the validity of the „three agnostics“ of the Enlightenment: the rationalist theology of Wolff, the critical philosophy of Kant and Jacobi's theology of feeling. The agnosticism of Wolff's rational theology was founded on objective view, whereas Kant's critical philosophy and Jacobi's philosophy of feeling refuted the possibility of knowing God based on subjective standpoints. H. held that these three theories are all based on the faculty of intellect rather than on the one of reasoning. He argued that reasoning can attain knowledge not only of the existence of God but also about God Himself.


*On the Concept of Irony* is based on a subtle critical dispute with H. Kierkegaard associates H. with Socratic irony, as the repressed prehistory of H.'s own speculative dialectics. This prehistory is centered in the concept of absolute infinite negativity, which makes irony comparable to doubt in terms of epistemology and to despair in terms of *Daseins*-analysis. This constellation analysed by Kierkegaard marks a clear refusal of H.'s speculative dialectics and already provides all the crucial
arguments against H.s philosophy, which claims to be a form of Christian thought, originally op-posed to paganism, that becomes pagan itself.

H.s early essay called The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate contains his longest analysis of the resurrection of Jesus, which he attributes to the spirit of the early Christian community. To represent its practice of the love he taught, the community made him into a god. Furthermore, because it withdrew from life in the world, the community knew its love as deficient, and portrayed this defect by adding the separate human individuality of its teacher to his divinity. The risen Christ (both human and divine) lives only in the subjective mind of the community, as an expression of its feeling. However, H. does recognize divine objectivity in the „one“ source of the universe, the Father of Jesus.

The article presents a commentary on the concept of desire by philosopher H. The author offers his views on H.s work Phenomenology of Spirit and dissects its details on self-consciousness and desire. He also evaluates the philosophical and ethical concepts of H. to show how desire relates to self-consciousness.

Was H.s political philosophy, in a proper sense, „liberal?“ For Renato Cristi the answer is a negative one. Without being a reactionary, H. never developed a „progressive liberalism“, as many contemporary interpreters tend to think; instead it consisted of an „authoritarian liberalism“ with a strong emphasis in authority than in freedom. H. built his theory of the state with an absolute power monarch whose task should be to pacify civil society’s struggling tendencies. By this way, H.s thought will be close to the classical authoritarian formulations of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Cristi’s thesis has to be analyzed both historically and conceptually, with special regard to his sources.

There are three kinds of bookshelves in Robbins Library, located on the second floor of Emerson Hall. There are those that Harvard students use frequently; these are almost always picked over, leaving only a few copies of Rawl’s A Theory of Justice and Russell’s Philosophical Essays behind. There are those that are seldom used, save the few days during exams when students are forced to revisit the history of philosophy. And then there are those that remain largely neglected; these hold the works of American pragmatism. Next to this shelf, in a truly forgotten corner of Robbins, is a very old-looking collection. This collection consists of the generous gifts from the personal libraries of the university’s faculty. George Santayana, for example, donated his copies of William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience and Josiah Royce’s The World and the Individual. Royce bequeathed his personal copies of Kant’s first critique, the Metaphysics of Morals, and James Martineau’s A Study of
Religion. In many instances, the notable owners of these volumes used them as makeshift notebooks, providing commentary and translations that demonstrate important turns in their thinking. Such is the case with two volumes that will serve as the focus of this article: Royce’s copies of H.s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logik*. On the flysheets and in the margins of the books, Royce provided a detailed interpretation of these texts, the study of which dramatically alters the chronology and study of Royce’s concepts of loyalty and communities of interpretation. In these books, we get to return to the unique conversation that Royce had with H. and to appreciate fully the affinities and differences that emerge in the discussion.


This paper addresses the relationship of ancients to moderns by focusing on the „quarrel“ between art and philosophy that has led to two articulations of the end of art – one in antiquity, another in modernity: Plato, who expelled the poets from his city on account of art’s irrationality, and H., for whom art was no more the necessary vehicle for truth. Following Giorgio Agamben’s cue in *The Man Without Content*, I opt for a symptomatic reading of Plato’s condemnation of art, by foregrounding his ambivalence toward poetry. I conclude that, whereas H. found poetry wanting, Plato understood poetry’s truth to be tragically excessive.


This essay investigates the problem that Goethe’s 1790 *Versuch über die Metamorphose der Pflanzen* presents to H.s representations of plant nature. Goethe’s essay argues for a view of plant vitality and inner direction operating in and on mechanisms of plant development. Precisely because Goethe’s essay revises and critiques the Naturphilosophie account of spirit in nature, he is in one sense H.s potential ally. But because Goethe also argues that an inner directed, apparently spiritual dimension of plant development is at work in its mechanical processes, he is also H.s necessary antagonist. As H. constructs an intricate, vexed account of plant unrest that rejects contemporary claims for plant life and inner-directedness in successive versions of his Philosophy of Nature, his consideration of Goethe’s analysis of plant metamorphosis shifts between critique and admiration. H.s remarkable claim that the plant sacrifices itself for others (a curious, if brief, moment of plant agency) is directed against Goethe and, more subtly, against H.s own reluctant notice of the categorical restlessness of plants. This set of differences, half masked by points of agreement, registers key antinomies in the nineteenth-century debate about individuality, singularity, species, and botanical nature and the unsettled ground of Romantic nature.


The article focuses on the arguments of philosopher H. concerning the general corruption of natural man in modernity. It explores H.’s explanations regarding the reflective thought in the modern man and the freedom of thought and society. Furthermore, it discusses the political and social philosophy of the philosopher towards modernity.


Taking into account H.’s suggestion on Novalis’ thought, we will outline the main characteristics of the concept of subjectivity for this author. Firstly, we will show the context in which this theory emerges. Secondly, we will elaborate on its relation with the question of Statement. Lastly, we will point out some aspects of Novalis’ philosophy related to his conception of Subject, such as the questions of art, religion and men’s destiny in history.


My aim in this paper is to suggest that intentions are, as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, not exclusively “private and interior” act-descriptions that agents alone determine. Rather, I argue that the true intention of an action is frequently constrained, and sometimes even determined, by the intersubjective and retrospective view of an action. I begin by offering an interpretation of H.’s account of intention in *The Philosophy of Right* – an interpretation that fits well with work by Charles Taylor and Michael Quante, but not with a recent paper by Arto Laitinen. Next I offer examples that support the view – consistent with my reading of H. – that sometimes the intersubjective and retrospective account of an action trumps the agent’s prior subjective act-description. Finally, I suggest that the H.ian view I sketch might be taken as a kind of externalism about intentions, on the order of externalism about epistemic justification.


The article talks about H.ian anecdotes. According to the author, one cannot assume that H. posits a static difference between anecdote and examples, a differentia for some common genus. The author argued that for H., all language is anecdotal for it conveys a „Beispiel“ that has been linguistically „aufgehoben.“ The author believes that any H.ian anecdote is also universal and therefore abstract simply because it is linguistic.


This article aims to show that the theory of violence in Marx and Engels is driven by a conceptual syntax which can be found in two important chapters of H.’s *Science of Logic* (‘Actuality’ and
‘Teleology’). These categories are the timeless schemata of the appearance of historical violence in H.s *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*. However it is possible to find in Marx’s writing on violence a sort of counter-movement that cannot be inscribed in the process of the becoming-subject of substance.


My argument in this paper is that H.s political philosophy is a balm for the lost souls of liberal individualism. I argue that politically, the free and equal individuals of the liberal, democratic, State must be reconciled to their fundamental inequality and powerlessness with regard to the State and the mass of public opinion. Philosophically, the free, rational, self-interested, morally autonomous, liberal individual exists in contrast to the world that gave birth to him. Thus the individual knows himself as an individual only insofar as he is able to rebel against society and oppose his judgment to the judgment of others. He thus vacillates between passive acceptance of institutional and cultural norms (if he is a good Kantian) and violent rejection of the status quo (if he is not). In either case he is unable to be what he is supposed to be: at home in the world as a free individual governed by peaceful equality. H.s political philosophy teaches us that by being good citizens, by understanding ourselves in relation to the world of other people, we do not limit or lose our freedom, we discover it, we do not lose our individuality, we find it.


The article focuses on the H.s phenomenology. It notes that the ontological core of his phenomenology is summarized in the formulation that Truth is the unity of subject and substance, an ontology in which Being is understood mainly in relation to strife. It cites that his phenomenology tries to prove that the unified knowledge of the world sought by science is intrinsically linked to the scope of faith, and the intelligibility of religion with science.


The article explores the transformation of transcendental idealism into absolute idealism completed by German philosopher H. It highlights the works of H. and German philosopher Immanuel Kant on the conditions of knowledge and the necessary forms of thinking in any object. Furthermore, it outlines the perception of H. regarding the truth and objectivity.


H.s logic is usually read as a book in metaphysics. Against this reading, I will argue that it ought rather to be read as a philosophy of logic, the main feature of which is its critique of formalism. The following claims capture the core of H.s antiformalism: (1) formalism cannot explain logical validity; (2) logical properties cannot be reduced to grammatical properties; (3) the content of every concept can be accounted for in terms of the inferential relations it holds with other concepts; (4)
logical validity can be accounted for in terms of the relations a reasoning maintains with some conceptual contents (ideas). This conception of logic results from a radicalisation of a Kantian thesis and aims at a normative theory of conceptual practices, not at an ontology.


The article discusses the concept of force underlying the basic premises of every area of human knowledge, from politics and law to philosophy and the physical sciences. A history of philosophical writings on force is outlined, including ones by classical Greek philosopher Aristotle, 19th-century German philosopher H., and the 20th-century thinkers Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.


The article presents a conception of the end of history, developed on the basis of Giorgio Agamben's critical engagement with Alexandre Kojève's reading of H. Departing from Agamben's concept of inoperosity as an originary feature of the human condition, we argue that the proper or 'second' end of history consists not in the fulfilment of its dialectical process but rather in the radical interruption of the dialectic that terminates the teleological dimension of social praxis. Introducing the figure of the 'workless slave' into the scenario of the Master-Slave dialectic, the article demonstrates how the dialectic of history may be ended in a non-dialectical fashion through inoperative praxis that subtracts itself from the struggle for recognition. In the conclusion, the implication of this reading of the end of history for the understanding of Agamben's 'coming politics' is addressed.


This article starts from two observations. The first is that some of the most prominent debates in social and political philosophy over the last few decades have been deeply obscured by the confusion of ontological / methodological and normative questions. And the second is that the renewed interest in H.s social philosophy has not yet yielded anything like a widely shared view as to whether it should be banned as a totalitarian or reappraised as a liberal account. The aim of this article is first to specify systematically the ontological / methodological and normative dimensions of social philosophy by giving precise definitions of core concepts and paramount positions. Secondly, it is argued that H.s social philosophy can be characterized as combining what is called vertical holism with liberal communitarianism. This, thirdly, sheds new light both on the nature of fundamental questions in social philosophy and on the systematic relevance of H.s social philosophy.

This article traces the influences which American pragmatist philosophy and Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics in particular received from the various idealist traditions of (a) the English romantic philosopher-poets, (b) Cambridge H.ians in the vein of Josiah Royce, (c–f) three different generations of Oxford H.ians, from Bosanquet to Collingwood, and, most directly relevant for Dewey’s philosophical development, (g) the late 19th century St. Louis H.ians William Torrey Harris and George Silvester Morris. Another important influence for Dewey’s pragmatism, as well as already for Bosanquet, was Darwinian evolutionary thought with its emphasis on the needs for adaptation. Central points of interest in the development of Dewey’s aesthetics which he shared to some degree with the British and American idealists were the concept of aesthetic experience, the cognitive relevance of imaginative experiences and the practical relevance of fine art for developing shared forms of life.


At the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel developed an influential theory of irony that anticipated some of the central concerns of post-modernity. His most vocal contemporary critic, the philosopher H., sought to demonstrate that Schlegel’s theory of irony tacitly relied on certain problematic aspects of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy. While Schlegel’s theory of irony has generated seemingly endless commentary in recent critical discourse, H.’s critique of Schlegelian irony has gone neglected. This essay’s primary aim is to defend H.’s critique of Schlegel by isolating irony’s underlying Fichtean epistemology. Drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony in the final section of this essay, I argue that H.’s critique of irony can motivate a dialectical hermeneutics that offers a powerful alternative both to Paul de Man’s poststructuralist hermeneutics and to recent cultural-studies-oriented criticism that tends to reduce literary texts to sociohistorical epiphenomena.


negativ beurteilt. Die Verf.in verweist darauf, daß H. schon in einigen Zusammenhängen der Phä
monologie des Geistes die antike Antigone der reinen Sittlichkeit mit der modernen Antigone der
wirklichen Sittlichkeit mit ihrer Mittelmäßigkeit verschmolzen hat.


The theorizing of seeing and visible has been a typical and essentially defining philosophical prob-
lem since the very beginning of philosophy. Plato and Aristotle define the basic ways of approach-
ing to reality. Whether it is considered to be illusion (idealism) or sensory givenness (materialism),
it always remains presented. We try to analyze different aspects which point out the cognitive side
of visual arts (painting above all) and which we recognize as consciousness of reality. The histori-
development of art, considering its cognitive character, appears explicitly with H. for the first
time. The necessary consequence of such development, according to H., is so called the end of
art which means that art emerging does not correspond to its ultimate definition and meaning.
His prediction of the death of art can be seen in the major part of the 20th century art, which
abandons mimetic presentation and aims at abstraction and the destruction of visual in narrow
sense. In spite of that, we are going to try to present even such an approach as the presentation of
something or as making something visible. That „something“ is, in our opinion, nothing else but
the consciousness of reality.

Russon, John: Emotional Subjects: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s Philosophy of

In his discussions of „sensibility“ and „feeling,“ H. has a compelling interpretation of the emo-
tional foundations of experience. I begin by situating „mood“ within the context of „sensibility,“
and then focus on the inherently „outwardizing“ or self-externalizing character of mood. I then
consider the different modes of moody self-externalization, for the sake of determining why we
express ourselves in language. I conclude by demonstrating why the notions of emotion and spirit
are necessarily linked.


The article presents the author’s insights on the essay Taking Curses: A Lacanian Reading of Hegel
and Kierkegaard on Language and Madness by Daniel Berthold. The author discusses the interest
of authors H. and Søren Kierkegaard which center on the relationship between self-experience,
language and the potential existence of an ineffable realm. The author cites key issues toward non-
linguistic realm including the validation of human orientation to ineffable.

Schwab, Philipp: Zwischen Sokrates und Hegel: Der Einzelne, die Weltgeschichte und
die Form der Mitteilung in Kierkegaards „Über den Begriff der Ironie“. — In: Kierke-

The article examines the relation of irony and indirect communication on the basis of Kierke-
gaard’s dissertation. The first goal is to show a structural parallel between the two theories as they
both can be conceptualized as a representation of the unrepresentable („Darstellung des Unda-
rstellbaren”). The second goal is to analyse the structural heterogeneity of Kierkegaard’s doctoral
thesis. Although the representation of the unrepresentable may be demonstrated in On the Concept
of Irony, it first has to be placed within the ambiguous design of the dissertation. In doing so, special attention is being paid to the contrast of an ‘existential’ perspective which understands Socrates’ irony as a standpoint and a world-historical perspective influenced by H. This contrast can especially be shown in the concept of ‘irony as mastered moment’.


This paper has four parts. First, I attempt to pinpoint how and why Merleau-Ponty was driven to go beyond Husserlian phenomenology, and did so for what are, largely, Hian reasons. Second, I trace the parallels between H.’s „metaphysics of spirit” and Merleau-Ponty’s „ontology of the flesh,” stressing the thinkers’ consensus about the nature of philosophical method. Third, I identify Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of H.’s approach, and assay his claim that H.’s system actually constitutes a lapse into a precritical, pre-Kantian, naive metaphysics. Fourth and finally, I examine how Merleau-Ponty’s critique of H. is tied to his investigation into the evolution of the concept of nature through the history of Western philosophy. My basic intention is to determine whether and to what extent Merleau-Ponty evades the very charges he levies against H., and my basic claim is that he does. I conclude by suggesting some parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s later thought and the account of nature in Whitehead’s process philosophy that might tell us where to seek help for developing his later, enigmatic ideas once precedents in Continental thought have been exhausted.


“To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rational in return. The relation is mutual.” This emblematic sentence illustrates H.’s philosophy of history as a hermeneutics of history which, opposed to the apriorism explicitly rejected, searches for its „empirical” verification in trying to „accurately apprehend” history. The much-celebrated “end of history” is not so much an empirical assertion about historical reality as a methodological requirement for an interpretative strategy founded upon the logical category of „true” or „genuine infinity.”


This article deals with absolute knowing as the spirit’s last form, introducing a double perspective (epistemological and logico-ontological). Through this it is finally possible to focus on the Hian proposal in the Phenomenology. Furthermore, the article concentrates on the relationship between religious and absolute knowing from an epistemic and a structural point of view, aiming at an original understanding that is capable of restoring the conceptual horizon of the nascent speculative logic to which absolute knowing is related.
Vieweg, Klaus: Pobreza y riqueza: Derecho de socorro y derecho de resistencia en Hegel. [Armut und Reichtum: Recht auf Notwehr und Recht auf Widerstand bei Hegel.]

In the Philosophy of Right, H. devotes special attention to one of the most worrying problems of modern societies and states: the unbalanced distribution of richness and its consequent chain of social inequalities and unjustness. In his analysis, H. stresses the idea that the conformation of a just civil society and a rational state or state of law, depends entirely on the recognizance, on the part of these spheres, of the rights of all the individuals who shall enjoy with dignity material possessions, that will enable them not only the assurance of the material conditions of existence, but also the participation and enjoyment of material and spiritual goods that sustain and give dynamics to „life in common.“ According to H.s diagnosis, such a recognizance has, certainly, its point of departure in the realms of abstract law and stretches into the realm of morality, in which realms the individual is recognized as a person and as a moral being, but it is only in the superior realm of ethics where the recognizance of all the rights that guarantee an honorable life, acquires universal validity and need, since it is this said sphere, concretely in the sphere of the state, where the said recognizance can take a hold in the different legal and juridical stances that conform it. Such is the path through which the political philosophy of H. tries to offer a solution to a problem that, such as the one pointed out, is still a threat to societies at present and questions the selfsame structures of power. Independently of the viability of the offered solution, the political philosophy of H. begs for a pertinent and unquestionable actuality.


H.s concept of truth and contemporary theories of truth could mutually profit from one another in two regards. H.s unity of truth and rationality makes an attempt to undermine the antagonism of internal and external concepts of knowledge and gives an account for truth in ethics. Ethical truth is accounted for by an external concept of practical rationality without assigning truth an epistemic design. To understand practical rationality, we must account for irrationality as a case of self-deception which seems to be incompatible with an external concept of rationality. H.s ‘inclusive monism’ elucidates a concept of rationality which complies with the requirements for ethical truth.

This paper analyzes the distinction between the positive and the negative philosophy, key concept in the Schelling’s „Spätphilosophie.“ For it we study first his critic to the idealism in the Freiheitschrift of 1809 and later we will stop in the interpretation that this author does of H.s philosophy. These two aspects of the Schelling’s philosophy will allow us to understand better the difference between his conception of positive and negative philosophy.


This essay explains the role of history and ethical life („Sittlichkeit“) in the first section of the chapter entitled “Spirit” in the Phenomenology of Spirit in which H. interprets the meaning of Sophocles’ Antigone as the best expression of the ancient Greeks’ ethical life in its preliminary and most immediate state. It is argued, first, that H.s understanding of the ethical life was developed as an alternative, based on history, to Kant’s notion of morals („Sitten“) and, second, that H. considered the ancient Greek mode of living limited by its immediacy and, therefore, never hoped to revive it during his own time.


The issue of this article is to examine the relationship of H.s political philosophy to traditional liberalism. In contradiction to the thinkers who propose that H.s opinions prepared the liberalism, H.s view on political philosophy and state in fact seems as the critique of liberalism. This article tries to expose a justification for this claim. While H.s notion of state recognizes many rights and freedoms associated with liberalism, his views on political philosophy, state and freedom can never be received as traditional liberalism.


Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to H. and beyond, has argued that democracy is an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy working today endorses democracy in one variety or another. In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and H. At first glance, each is rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have been represented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian) democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we
can uncover a new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and H. not enemies of modern democratic thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a positive, not negative, manner.


Shlomo Avineri first suggested some forty years ago that H.s remarks in favor of Jewish emancipation in the Philosophy of Right were initially made in Heidelberg to support the majority of students within the Allgemeine Burschenschaft there who – against the general consensus within the „Burschenschaften“ movement as a whole – insisted on the admission of Jewish students to their fraternity. While Avineri’s account needs to be modified in some respects, the publication of the Wannemann transcript of H.s lectures in Heidelberg has since confirmed that these remarks were indeed made in Heidelberg and clearly did constitute a deliberate political act.


This essay intends to discuss the starting point of H.s criticism of Spinoza. According to H., Spinoza’s idea does not manage, even though it wants to, to give an absolute foundation to difference and self-conscious singularity; that is why the Dutch thinker did not reach the specificity of the modern conception of freedom, as it is represented by Christianity and effectively developed in modernity by the mediation of the particularity in the civil-bourgeois society. H. hopes to demonstrate his thesis analyzing Spinoza’s concepts of substance, attributes and modes; there is not between them, according to H.s criticism, an immanent negative development. Consequently, Spinoza’s thought ends up in an impasse: or the finite modes keep a juxtaposed existence to substance or they annihilate themselves because of it. To H., it is the second alternative that characterizes Spinoza’s thought.

This paper examines contrasting interpretations of abstract art from a H.ian perspective that have been put forward by Stephen Houlgate and Robert Pippin. Drawing on recently published textual sources, it challenges the assumptions behind both positions and defends an alternative set of proposals based on the claim that the contemporary relevance of H.s aesthetics lies in his acknowledgment of the irreducibly historical character of art rather than a prior set of normative commitments.


This essay aims at defining the relationship between theoretical purpose and historical research in Karl Löwith’s thought. Focusing on three symbolic moments of his reflection, the author reconstructs the trajectory followed, according to Löwith, by Western thought after H.s identification of philosophy and history and suggestion of its possible overcoming. The movement outlined leads from H.s absolutization to Heidegger absolute relativization of history, ending with Löwith’s own proposal of an anthropological reading of history, which draws its inspiration from Burckhardt and aims at redeeming thought from its remission to the destiny of Being or the history of the Spirit and at restoring it in its human dimension.


In this essay I argue against Heidegger’s claim that H. merely repeats Aristotle’s „vulgar“ conception of time. Unlike Aristotle, H. does not simply assume that being is presence and time, but rather argues for this claim by starting from nothing but space. Furthermore, H. shows (contra Heidegger) that the temporality of „Dasein“ is not the originary time of which H.ian time is merely a vulgar derivative. On the contrary, truly primordial time is the self-negating presence that space proves to be. This is presupposed, along with space and materiality, by „Dasein“’s ecstatic temporality.
Nachträge zum Berichtszeitraum 2006 257


The article initially presents the charge of nihilism that Jacobi addressed against Fichte and against philosophy as such in the atheism controversy. H. and Schelling agreed on validity of the objection, yet they regarded the nihilism as a necessary consequence of an arbitrary limitation of philosophy to the formal reflection and saw their duty precisely in the cognitive integration of that nothing. But if Schelling intended to fulfil it promptly and easily by simply affirming the absolute identity, H. insisted that the cognition of nothing should be carried out reflectively, as the work of the concept, and should have a determinate outcome. In this sense, H.'s speculative idealism is a conceptual completion of nihilism.


The first part is devoted to H.'s method and to the specifics of his theory of consciousness as a theory of the mental. The second part presents an approach to detailed analyses of the first chapter of the Phenomenology. The primary form of consciousness would like, by means of its minimal conceptual apparatus (indexical expressions), to receive the variety of what is offered to it. The relating of sense-based certainty to the variety of individual things soon, however, displays itself as aporetic because the indicators have no descriptively-determinable content. Its aporetic situation is diagnosed as being the consequence of its own requirement to relate straight to individual things, without the contribution of concepts, albeit in the mode of knowledge. In the third part, the author finally shows that we can relate to individuals in space and time (in thought and speech) by means of indicators which create a system of coordinates.


Building on recent research exposing H.'s debt to esoteric Christianity (both Gnostic and Hermetic traditions), the aim of this paper is to show how H. and Schelling resolve an ambiguity in Böhme's theology of evil in opposing ways. Jacob Böhme's notion of the individuation of God through the overcoming of opposition is the central paradigm for both H.'s and Schelling's understanding of the role of evil in the life of God. Böhme remains ambiguous on the question of the modality of evil: Is it necessary to God's self-unfolding, or is it rather an anarchic act that God permits in the interest of preserving the autonomy of finite freedom? If the former, Böhme becomes much more closely aligned to Gnosticism by identifying finitude with evil. This identification is shown to be exactly H.'s solution to the ambiguity, one H. opts for in the interest of maintaining the absolute rationality of the system. Hermeticism opposes Gnosticism on this point: for the Hermeticist, finitude, material being, nature is not evil but ‘of God’, the means of his individuation. This conflict in interpretations of Böhme illuminates an often overlooked but essential difference between Gnosticism and Hermeticism. Schelling remains faithful to the Hermetic tradition by sacrificing system for the sake of preserving the contingency of evil, and disidentifying finitude and evil.

Through the conceptual genesis of the contract in the alienation of property H. shows the appearance of the plurality of the proprietors’ wills and the merely formal character of their reciprocal recognition, and establishes an essential link between the contract and the realm of property, which allows him to subvert the classic juridical distinction between personal rights and real rights. The contingency contained in the real possibility of nonexecution of what was stipulated implicates, according to the logic internal to the contract, the necessary conceptual passage from contract to delict („unjust“), whose modalities are unfolded according to the aggravation of the opposition between the subjective private will and the objective universality of the right, culminating in crime as an extreme and exemplary form of the denial of right. Concerning crime, H. criticizes the penal theories founded in social criteria starting from a retributive conception of the punishment that, as „retaliation,“ is conceived as a second negation that denies the first negation of the right contained in the crime, which thereby reestablishes the right, and justifies the punishment as a right of the criminal himself.


The paper aims to introduce you to a peculiar aspect of H.s reflection, a feature of his thought that might be called ‘logic of the Fourth,’ through the analysis of some of the most important work of the German philosopher as in the case of Science of Logic and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Two hundred years after his Phenomenology of the Spirit – and a century after Benedetto Croce’s invitation to determine “what’s alive” and “what’s dead” in H.s – the goal is hence double. On the one hand, we examine the contradictions of H.s “absolute knowledge” in the light of the theoretical relation between system and method. On the other hand, the “logic of the Fourth” enlightens which are the aspects of H.s reflection that are more contemporary to the current investigation, specially when studying the adaptative complex systems and their evolution.


Within all philosophical systems there are some categories that are fundamental to the understanding of the whole. This is the case of categories such as identity, difference and contradiction in H.s philosophy. In the second book of the Logik, such categories are set in what appears to be the heart of the H.ian project: to establish a critical relation with transcendental philosophy that leads to a post-Kantian metaphysics, evident above all in the unity of the thinking subject and the
thought object. That is why, this paper is structured into three main sections: (1) the relation that H. establishes with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (2) an analysis of the categories of identity, difference and contradiction as they appear in the two versions of the *Logik* and, (3) some conclusions that arise from the vindication of the category of contradiction, without a doubt, the most controversial among the notions of the philosophy of the concept.


This essay explains H.s use of the term „forms of life“ („Lebensformen“) from his earlier works, in which it expresses a kind of „organic“ unity between concepts and intuitions, to its use in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as „shapes of spirit.“


This essay explores the impact of H. on feminism in France. It shows how the discussion notably on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has shaped the feminist theory of Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. In this context H. becomes a point of reference of the antagonistic concepts of equality and difference, and eventually of the deconstruction of sexual identity.


This article is a revision of the criticism that H. makes to conception of nature that underlies Fichte’s theoretical and practical philosophy. In H.s *Difference between the Philosophical System of Fichte and Schelling* (1801), H. directs his reflection to the relation between dominance and submission that Fichte’s philosophy establishes between reason and nature. And this, to such a degree, that it turns out to be the base for the deduction of natural right, whose main purpose is to show the possibility of auto-conscience and, with it, that of the human community in general. H. shows that Fichte’s deduction is contradictory, and from his critique he will lay down a new concept of nature.

Safatle, Vladimir: Linguagem e negação sobre as relações entre pragmática e ontologia em Hegel. [Sprache und Negation: über die Beziehungen zwischen Pragmatik und Ontologie bei Hegel.] — In: Dois Pontos. Curitiba, São Carlos, BR. 3 (2006), 1, 109–146. (Series: Subjetividade e linguagem) [(Reihe: Subjektivität und Sprache)]

This article aims to discuss the H.ian theory of language focusing in the crossbreed between pragmatic and ontology. We need to understand the way that H. considers the pragmatic of language from the start point of the ontological negation’s manifestation in the field of consciousness's linguistics experiences.


By setting philosophy in a new direction H. rendered philosophy truly historical and formulated a powerful conception of what I will call naturalized spirituality. Those are the two themes I would like to pursue in this essay, what it means to say that H. rendered philosophy historical and what is meant by „naturalized spirituality.“


H., in his lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, presents the course of a human life in four stages: childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age. Max Stirner, who, in the spring semester of 1827, had attended H.s lectures on this subject, also presented these four stages in the first chapter of his work, The Ego and His Own. This chapter, „A Human Life,“ provides an insight not only into the basis of his critique of Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy as that of an „adolescent,“ but also of Stirner’s own emotional development.


In our opinion, translations that have been done to H.s works to Spanish do not tend to lead the reader to the right interpretation of H.s thoughts. H.s interpreters like A. Kojeve, M. Heidegger and N. Hartmann dismiss H.s dialectic and even ignore Feuerbach as well as Marx’s existence. Thus, we have worked on a H.ian glossary of terms, regarding the different ways his works have been translated and our criticisms to those translations, „The Unknown Hegel.“


In this study, the history of the world as conceived by H. is investigated on the basis of Sections 330–360 of his Philosophy of Right. H.s theory is afterwards linked to Kant’s theses concerning the pax perpetua. Finally, Kant’s and H.s approaches on war and peace shall be assessed by comparing them to Hobsbawn’s views on the political international scene of the 20th and 21st centuries.

This work will show how thought on the tragic as a literary genre but, farther from it, as a metaphor for the characteristic dualities of modernity, played a fundamental role in the configuration and the development of the thought of both authors. Both for Schiller and for the young H., tragedy became the theoretical frame and the referential space of a proposal that, in the first case tries to recuperate the possibility of liberty for man in the world and, in the second case, interprets the movement of thought in reality. Along the text both the similarities they share and the differences between the two authors will be emphasized, starting from the way in which each of them understood and assimilated the tragic to his own reflection.


The author considers two meanings of “the need of philosophy” in H.s writing. “The need of philosophy” implies that consciousness has a need for philosophy and that philosophy itself has a need for dichotomy. The subjective need for philosophy is the motivation for an individual to get involved with philosophy, for there is the possibility of finding truth there. Yet, this already assumes an insurmountable separation from the truth. Still, the fact that philosophy also has a need for dichotomy tells us that, for H., it can overcome the most hostile of oppositions.


This paper considers H.s analysis of conscientious conflict in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a resource for thinking through the possibility and nature of true community. H.s account speaks to the growing awareness that ideals of tolerance and of multicultural acceptance lack force in the face of the realities of intercultural conflict and violence that are increasingly manifest in our world. He shows that even with the best intentions, there can be no genuine community rooted in bare assertions of mutual acceptance. Differences and conflict are not only inescapable, but can be productive insofar as we learn to interpret the inevitable conflicts that arise from these differences as legitimate expressions of the true nature of a shared situation. Genuine communities cannot be built either upon the mere celebration or violent suppression of differences, but only as „we“ learn to take conflict and differences seriously and learn from them who „we“ are together and allow these discoveries to shape who we will become.

The article discusses the dissertation about the freedom of conscience and subjective right in reference with H.s political philosophy. This paper investigated the status of liberty of conscience. It highlights the conception of liberty and its compatibility with liberal conceptions of freedom of conscience.


Appraisals of H.ian philosophy changed along history. Some of its parts were appreciated and positively valued: among others, its conjectures about history or the progress and development of the conscience, as well as its ethical or aesthetic reflections. Its “logic,” too, is still appreciated by the philosophers, although some of its conceptions have been discarded. Nevertheless, other parts deserved contempt and indifference of the scientific community, for example its “philosophy of nature.” The developments and speculations that appear there are deemed a delusion and pure deliria. Despite this, it cannot be denied that some of its ideas have an ontological and epistemological interest. In proof of it, we will analyse the conceptual development of the concept of space.


This article tries to illuminate what the phrase “end of art” attributed to H. means with respect to the history of aesthetics and philosophy of art. The phrase „end of art“ is explained in context of the relation between art and truth. H. ascribes rational value to art as well as to philosophy and religion. Hence, he reconstitutes the lost relation between art and truth. Although for H., in comparison with philosophy and religion, art cannot prove adequate to the articulation of the Absolute, it survives its existence in various genres.


The article analyzes the philosophy of H. on Jews, animals and disease in his book Philosophy of Nature. It points out that disease in the book is related to race and racial identity in addition to animality. Also noted is the play out of the connection between particular and universal, which is underpinned by the philosophy about the connection between the individual and the state of


The article examines the master-slave dialectic conceptualized by philosopher H. It is said that H. has supported philosopher Aristotle in the notion that individuals who risked their own life are recognized as masters while those who decided to preserve it for their freedom are referred to as servants. The phenomenological discourse of H. is said to have taken place on the abstract level of self-consciousness. The arguments by critics about the non-existence of master-slave dialectic are discussed.


This paper intends to investigate the development of the “ethical spirit” in H.'s Jena writings. Based on H.'s notion of consciousness as “middle” („Mitte”), discussed in the philosophy of the spirit (1803/04), the task is firstly to analyze the methodological conditions for the foundation of ethical life's unfolding on a consciousness theory. Then the aim is to consider the development of ethical spirit as a movement in which its intersubjective constitution and the relation of the individual to the ethical substance are articulated. Finally, starting with H.'s conception of practical reason as ethical life, delineated in the Phenomenology, I argue that, besides the connection between consciousness theory and conceptual development of ethical life, H. maintained that twofold constitution of the ethical spirit.


H. has been criticized for being obscure and abstract. In his short essay, Who Things Abstractly?, H. strikes back. The essay is clear, well illustrated, profoundly practical. H. explains that „abstract“ thinking focuses on some aspects of an object or situation but ignores other, important aspects. That leads to inadequate, mistaken, unfair perceptions and understandings. By contrast, „concrete“ thinking endeavors to leave out nothing and to understand how all of the aspects of an object or situation relate to and influence one another. I show how H.'s distinction illuminates problems with racism, infatuation, and extra-marital affairs.

H.s Philosophy of Right has been defended in the last decades against political and methodological critic by authors who belong or are near to the hermeneutic current of philosophy, like Karl-Otto Apel, Rüdiger Bubner, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor. This article revises shortly some of their arguments about two principal issues: 1) Free will and institutionality, 2) Action and practical reason. The conclusion points out the comparison between the moral philosophy of Kant and some weak elements in H.s position.


This paper traces the origins of the phrase “God is dead!” back to H. and Luther. It proceeds in the following four steps: Section I investigates the appearance of the theme of God’s death in Lutheran theology. Section II elaborates on H.s adaptation of this theme in the context of his early work Faith and Knowledge. In section III, the paper continues on how the theme of the death of God developed from Luther to Nietzsche via H., before concluding, in section IV, by indicating the link between Protestantism and modern atheism.


The stone and the voice have been traditionally set up as the maximum opposition: the stone as the epitome of the inert dead materiality, the voice as the harbinger of spirit and transcendence. The two come together in H.s treatment of the Egyptian statue of Memnon. The paper scrutinizes two instances of high modernism, Sartre’s Nausea and Beckett’s Trilogy, which both have a certain understanding of the stone and the voice at their core. While Sartre brings this opposition to an extreme – the stone as the source of nausea, the voice as the cure against nausea – Beckett does something very different: he collapses it into a zone of ‘extimacy’ where both the stone and the voice are placed alongside each other.


In spite of his deep insights, H. fails to grasp the specific character of the war waged by the French Revolution and the Empire. His theory of limited warfare turns out to be a peculiar “Sollen,” but it is precisely this gap between rationality and reality what makes his classical model an appealing antithesis to postmodern violence.

The concept of recognition („Anerkennung“) in H.s social thought, developed foremost in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, suggests that H. had a univocal understanding of what it means to be a member of a ethical community construed as the I that is a we, and the we that is an I. Moreover, H.s dictum that the principle of the modern age is that „all are free,“ combined with his idea that freedom is actualized only when universality is consciously known and willed, raises the question as to whether H.s conception of ethical life („Sittlichkeit“) requires a type of society in which everyone possesses a fully actualized relation to the state, perhaps similar to a Rousseauian republic of self legislators but with a more elaborate system of institutional mediations.


In this essay, it is purposed to look at H.s concepts of ‘one’ and ‘many’ concerning the concept of ‘two’. The concept of two means that two positions both different from each other and the same are inseparable and side by side together. Here, by departing from H.s assertion in his *Science of Logic* that one and many are the same, it is claimed that this sameness can be demonstrated by using the concept of two. This study also, by emphasizing the argument that one and many are a two among twos, follows the track of its dialectical results in H.ian sense.


This article considers Santayana’s critique of H., which includes a sweeping assessment of transcendental criticism in the post-Kantian tradition. I argue that Santayana takes to heart transcendental critique in his view that all consciousness is a form of delusion, a view that develops out of his unique deployment of the transcendental method, which realizes itself in the discovery of essence. The recovery of discredited notions of traditional philosophy is subsequently recommended in Santayana’s distinction between „normal“ and „abnormal“ forms of consciousness, the latter of which have as their preeminent philosophic representative the philosophy of H., and the former of which is found in a reconstructed form of naturalistic materialism.


Albeit the evident distance between H.s and Nietzsche’s philosophical projects, there is a shared terrain from which both authors respond to the excesses of modern illustration, which reacted against history and tradition, in the name of a subjective consciousness understood as the unconditioned nucleus of reality. This paper wants to contribute to show how close to each other are these so-called antagonists, showing that in their doctrines there is an intuition about the fundamental temporality that lies in human existence and experience. From this common point of view, articulated in both cases with the notions of „remembrance“ and „forgetfulness,“ it is the purpose to generate a living dialogue, however full of tensions, between H. and Nietzsche, as critics of modernity.

In contrast to the opinion of a large group of scholars, Brandom claims that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* both belong to the same system. Brandom focuses on a constellation of crucial theoretical notions – negation, determinateness, contradiction, concept, judgement, objectivity, truth – showing how the contents that H. presents of each one of them in those two works may be interpreted as consistent elements of an inferential and historical semantic holism. In the case of four of these notions – negation, contradiction, judgement and concept – I believe it can be argued that the interpretation Brandom proposes, in which contradiction is seen as a provisional but ever impending conflict between empirical judgements, misunderstands H.s statements about the development of concept. These statements, I argue, can indeed be interpreted differently if they are intended as indications of predication’s types necessary in the illustration of a content, contradiction is rather that which imposes the construction of richer categorial models as aspects of the process of conceptual comprehension.

This paper argues, in sharp contrast to a traditional view, that classical German philosophy, far from considering individuals mere appendages of the state, proposes a significant theory of constitutional state („Rechtsstaat”) even before liberal jurists have formulated it. This theory, however, is a critical one, inasmuch as it highlights the illusionary character of the liberal conception according to which civil society could completely escape the guardianship of the state. For Fichte and H., as well as for Kant, only a true state, with attributes of its power, can be a true constitutional state.


The article proposes to develop the hypothesis put forward by Pierre-Jean Labarriere, who points out that the figure of evil and its forgiveness condenses the first part of the phenomenology of the spirit, which extends from the very beginning of the work until the end of the section, for it is there where the unfolded form of the concept is exhibited. Therefore, the point of view which is privileged is the one that sustains that the difficulty of the figure in question should be the allegorical presentation of H.s original solution to the problem of the achievement of freedom opened by Kant's practical philosophy, the sense of which it is necessary to unravel. Nevertheless, the logical reconstruction of the triadic structure of the concept's form cannot be a reason to neglect the content of the last figure of the spirit, which is summarized in the famous figure of forgiveness.


H.s largely untranslated Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts assign religion a vital role in shaping basic intuitions about justice and society. This role in cultivating intuitions gives society reason to be highly attentive to the political attitudes instilled by religious traditions. At the same time, since these intuitions can be questioned and revised, religion need not be a conversation stopper. H. thus connects religion to politics in a way that accounts for religion's political significance without conceiving it as immune to challenge. He brings religious claims into public discourse and contributes significantly to contemporary discussions of religion and democracy.


Topics include: (1) Rousseau versus Hobbes’s system regarding the opposition between ‘state of nature’ and ‘civil state’; (2) war as a consequence of the ‘civil state’, as well as, according to Rousseau, a kind of conflict between states; (3) war and despotism in Rousseau’s thought; (4) the Rousseauian distinction between „guerre” and „etat de guerre;” (5) the war’s inevitability in a sovereign entities'
context, from the different points of view both of Rousseau and of H.; (6) the Kantian rational imperative of peace; (7) the perpetual peace as a progressive historical achievement; (8) republican state, citizenship and peace according to Kant; (9) the defensive federalism from the „zum ewigen Frieden” and a universal association of states as hopeful prospects for peace; (10) the cosmopolitan law; (11) the H.ian view of war as a rational procedure to settle critical conflicts between states; (12) war as civic virtue training, according to H., as well as to Kant; (13) the military „professionalism of courage” and the constraints of rational wars conduct, according to H.; (14) the advanced military technology as a factor to make the war irrational; (15) Kant’s coming back.


This essay deals with the probable origin of the conception of linear, ascending development, whose most prominent representatives in the modern era were H. and Marx. In opposition to the circular concept of historical evolution, which was prevailing in many cultures, the theories of linear ascending development have their roots in theological elements of the Judean-Christian tradition. But when applied to practice, these doctrines exhibit authoritarian and technocratic consequences, which are not congruent with the idea of a development open to several options.


The idea of ‘state’ has a dominant position in H.s political philosophy. „People” (“Volk”) is a comparatively subordinate entity, often described as a „formless aggregate.” This would suggest H.s theory to be exempt from all tint of populism in the now current acception of the term. However, his descriptions of particular aspects of political life are permeated with fictitious and irrationalistic notions circulating in German traditional populist ideologies, among them, Eurocentric views of colonial expansion. A survey of H.s political theories suggests that such an assumption of current acritical tenets is a consequence of the idealistic speculative structure of his philosophy.


What Althusser’s concepts of theoretical practice and material existence of ideology have in common, is a Spinozist kind of ontology, demonstrated in the paper as the ontology of complete, nonhierarchical surfaces. The surfaces have a special characteristic, which defines them, though they are blind to it: they are ruptured. Althusser’s epistemological distinction between the object of cognition and the real object can also be explained with the relation between the surface and
the rupture of the surface, since the real object is not a positive thing-in-itself that becomes a thing-for-us only through the process of cognition, as it possesses the character of pure negativity. In this respect, it seems, Althusser’s theses are closer to those of his proclaimed adversary, H., than to those of Spinoza.


The present paper deals with the idea that paying attention to the history of philosophy comes second to the appearance of historical thought in the modern period. In the light of the questions pertaining to the essence of nature in this period and the expansion of its laws and principles in the domain of human life, some questions were also posed regarding the nature of history. Therefore, history turned into one of the sources of knowledge. By inquiring into the nature of the history of philosophy, H. considered it to be the essence of the history of the world. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he first talks about the nature of the history of philosophy and then, in line with the principles of his own historical thought, refers to the periods of the history of philosophy in its geographical development from the East to the West. The writer of this paper has treated this issue on the basis of H.s Lectures on the History of Philosophy.


The article states that what Carl Schmitt describes as occasionalism is termed “irony” by H. This connotes that the conception of freedom and subjectivity that permits for and even demands the appearance of the exception is one that celebrates the ironic detachment of the free individual. Moreover, H.s presentation of his Ethical Life (“Sittlichkeit”) is meant to be a further offshoot of Kantian morality.


From the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of culture, we analyze both of the basic meanings in which we understand the concept of such: culture as a real condition, historic-social, of human life; or culture – as a certain way of cultural manifestations: science, technique, and law – as a way of emancipation and full human development; in other words: the concept substantive, historic-concrete, and the concept formal, properly illustrated of culture. It seems clear that, within the great philosophers of the illustration, H. is the representative of the first and Kant of the second. Both philosophers define the two fundamental models with which classic modernity has thought of the problem of culture, and represent the basis for an integral comprehension of the concept of culture.

The present article intends to show the double perspective of philosophy teaching set forth in a disjunctive form: to learn how to philosophize or to learn philosophy represented respectively by Kant and H. The analysis of this matter will be developed in the Kantian philosophy context pointing out its threefold aspects: (a) the ideal of perfectibility of the humankind; (b) the „Aufklärung“ precept of using one's own intellect and the critical use of reason, and (c) the need of coercion as an instrument for the fulfillment of the normative feature the human conduct. These aspects will also be dealt within H.s philosophy, as well as its consequences for the teaching of philosophy, and the possibility of a nondisjunctive choice of either perspective.


The purpose of this article is to analyze the relations between Rawls's and H.s political thought – considered by the former as a „liberalism of freedom“ – regarding the theme of reconciliation. Firstly, we will analyze the H.ian concept of reconciliation. Secondly, we will proceed to a reading of some aspects of the Rawlsian theory, based in that concept, in order to eventually underscore its value in Rawls's work. Therefore, the article verifies in which way the critical reception of the H.ian theme of reconciliation can stimulate an adjustment of the political liberalism to the demands of the historical reality of modern liberal societies, covering, in this manner, a deficit of political liberalism in relation to communitarian criticisms, especially, the question of abstract normativism.


This contribution explores the impact of H. on feminism in France. It shows how the discussion notably on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has shaped the feminist theory of Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. In this context H. becomes a point of reference of the antagonistic concepts of equality and difference up to the point of deconstruction of sexual identity.


In this paper we address Kant's thesis of human beings’ „unsocial sociability“ and a number of related themes such as perpetual peace, cosmopolitanism and patriotism and how this thesis was extended by H. „Unsocial sociability“ works well as a conceptual framework with which to address the current difficulties facing democracies, in both the international sphere and in the sphere of their internal pluralism of a cultural and, in some cases, a national, nature. Kant and H. are philosophers of history because both offer ways to overcome many conflicts through politics. From a contemporary per-
spective, "unsocial sociability" is a concept which complements – in an individual dimension (Kant) as well as in a sociopolitical dimension (H.) – what is an unavoidable feature of the contemporary world: the pluralism of values, interests and identities, which are usually agonistic in nature, and which are endowed with emotional components.


The aim is to demonstrate the Phenomenology of Spirit positions the tragic in the center of H.ian dialectic. For this, we will analyse the development of this thought in H. The tragic character who belongs to the stage of unreflecting "Sittlichkeit" is one who has an immediate uncritical identity with the law. This because in the Greek city-state the man is not ready for reconciliation with the truly universal. Conversely, in the same epoch, the people who really grasp the full universality of spirit, the Jews, are those who feel the greatest alienation from the divine. But the universal must find some expression; and since the gods are particular, the universal reappears as the necessity of fate that even the gods are subject. And H. explicits the inner tension and conflict of Greek society in the medium of Sophoclean tragedy.


Marx's concepts of individual and society have their roots in H.s philosophy. Like recent communitarian philosophers, both Marx and H. reject the idea that the individual is an atomic entity, an idea that runs through liberal social philosophy and classical economics. Human productive activity is essentially social. However, Marx shows that the liberal concepts of individuality and society are not simply philosophical errors; they are products and expressions of the social alienation of free market conditions. Marx's theory develops from H.s account of 'civil society' and uses a framework of historical development similar to H.s. However, Marx uses the concept of alienation to criticize the liberal, communitarian and H.ian conceptions of modern society and to envisage a form of individuality and community that lies beyond them.


This essay deals with Ernst Bloch's reception of H. and its meaning in the development of his thinking. Considered are the H.ian conceptions of mind and drive, of dialectics and totality, of (onto-logical) identity and aim as well as their transformation by Bloch. Regarding his connections to Kant and Marx one can recognize the basic operation: the concepts of H.s philosophy of the Absolute are connected with a „not-yet“ and their totality is projected in the future. The real challenge of Bloch's philosophy is that he keeps to the aims of the classical philosophy in a post-H.ian situation.


In diesem Aufsatz werden die wichtigsten Aspekte von Slavoj Žižek's Buch *Nedjeljivi ostatak* (Der unteilbare Rest) kritisch analysiert und kommentiert. Vor dem Hintergrund einer Loslösung von der (materialistischen) Metaphysik bietet Žižek eine überzeugende Deutung der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie.


In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* H. considers his ideas regarding Enlightenment in a more different way than his other works (e.g., *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*). H.'s approach to Enlightenment in this work is realized in the frame of the historical adventure of consciousness. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Enlightenment does not appear anymore in the form of singular consciousness but appears as a world form. In this instance movement of consciousness to self-consciousness reveals itself once again. This movement also brings with itself alienation process. While consciousness in itself is becoming consciousness for itself, it alienates things which are outside of it. In one respect this alienation is a new picture of unhappy consciousness. Conflict between faith and insight also gets a different dimension in utilitarianist ethics and terror.


The problem of theodicy, understood as the problem of the hiddenness of God’s love in human life, confronts us with the question of where and how God’s love can appear. Kierkegaard’s answer is implied in his theological and ethical phenomenology of the invisible in *Works of Love*. In which sense, however, can Kierkegaard be called a ‘phenomenologist’, if at all? This article suggests that he should be historically and conceptually located between German idealism and French phenomenology. It focuses on the commonalities and differences with H.s phenomenology of spirit and Levinas’s phenomenology of the interhuman with(out) the elusive trace of God’s (non-)phenomenality.

The logical investigation of thinking must not be confused with inquiry into the mental reality of thought, which properly falls within the philosophy of mind. H. provides an important, but much neglected contribution towards accounting for the psychological conditions of reason by detailing in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit how intelligence can progress from representation to thought. By thinking through H.’s argument, we can comprehend why thinking is a matter of intelligence rather than consciousness, why representation cannot provide the universality of conceptualization, and how semiotic imagination enables intelligence to leave representation behind and enter the domain of thought, unencumbered by the opposition of consciousness. Through this result, the philosophy of mind can account for the psychological conditions of its own theorizing.

For H. all elements of knowledge belong to mind itself. Contrary to Kant’s philosophy, reason is able to reach absolute knowledge. All things that are found in consciousness are forms of experience – so consciousness experiences infinite things also.


The author discusses the other as an animal. He notes that animals have been accommodated in the history of philosophy in which they are considered as constituting exclusion. The discussion of disease is also examined in H.’s Philosophy of Nature. According to the author, the presence of an animal, in the perspective of Jewish thought, serves as the presence of an other which is based on particularity and not universality.


In spite of Kierkegaard and Deleuze’s manifest attempts to separate the category of repetition from the H.ian concept of mediation, I consider that both notions keep a close relationship as to their structural dynamism and their reflexively dialectical content. The following pages will attempt to show that the concept of mediation sets the speculative ground of what contemporary philosophy proposes as the constant return of an ever new identity, whose affirmation is self-differentiation and whose difference is a totally relational identity. Identity in difference and difference in identity ensures the repetition of an absolute which is permanently coming to be.


The article examines the concept of so-called master-slave dialectic, which is said to be discovered by philosopher H. It argues that the intention of H. is to try to illustrate a prehistory of the concept of modern self-consciousness. According to an etymology passed on by Roman law, the individuals who have risked their own life are acknowledged as masters while those who opted to preserve it for their freedom are considered as servants.


The article analyzes H.’s treatment of Sophocles’ play Antigone. The article discusses the tension between civil and religious autonomy in the cultural landscape. The article also focuses on the identification of women with ethical environments, as well as their relationship with public law.
The article mentions the characters of Antigone and Creon from the play. The article discusses the relationship between unreflective norms and explicit norms, as well as „Sittlichkeit,” which is defined in the article as ethical substance, divine and human laws, and the polarities of ethical life.


In his Introduction to the History of Philosophy H. states that the deeds proper to the history of philosophy are the activities of free thought. This paper is an attempt to unpack this very complex claim. In the course of this explication, I show what H. means by thought and illuminate his distinction between reason and understanding as well as the relationship between reason and freedom. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of H.s understanding of the history of philosophy as the history of free rational thought to the study of the history of philosophy in general.


Two important ethical conceptions in the history of the philosophy have in common the pretension to establish universal parameters, in order to motivate their recognition from all human beings: the ethical proposal of H. and Habermas. In their study it is necessary to place them in perspective with some notions of Kant and Mead, to evaluate the overcoming that is tried to make from the formal ethic to the ‘pragmatic formal’ of the dialogue ethic proposed by Habermas.


This article studies the meaning of the act of Antigona, which is analyzed according to H. and Butler’s conceptual frame. It is specially stressed that Antigona’s fundamental action – according to Butler – depends on agency. Whereas H. does not understand similarly the concept and the reason of her act. So, he limits himself in locating Antigona as a case in the development of the spirit.


An essay is presented that uses the work of H. to analyze conflicts in the 21st century world. The article analyzes the presence of Sophocles’ play Antigone in H.s Phenomenology of Spirit. The author argues that contemporary discourses do not acknowledge the conflicts between values defended by cultural minorities and the state. The article mentions decolonization, Western democratic societies in the 20th century, Muslim fundamentalism, the paradigm of modernity, tragic conflicts, and non-modern modes of religious, cultural, and ethnic particularity.
With the profound renewal of political philosophy that happened since the 1970s, the objection of „empty formalism“ directed by H. against Kant's moral theory has been returning to the contemporary philosophical debate over the moral foundations of the political community. This fact raises interest in H.s first attempt to overcome Kant's practical philosophy: the project of a radical critique of deontological ethics that he planned in Frankfurt and was based on the concept of love, whose inherently intersubjective character underlines the social significance of what H. later conceived as the „Aufhebung“ of the moral point of view in ethical life. Firstly, this paper aims to outline H.s early critique of the Kantian-Fichtean idealism in the light of his historical philosophical investigations in Tübingen, Bern and Frankfurt. The second part is an attempt to reexamine the relationship between H.s conception of love and his critique of deontological morality, as it is presented in *Der Geist des Christentums*. 

Instead of emphasizing their rivalry and philosophical differences, the proposal of this article is to show that H. and Schleiermacher have important similarities especially concerning the concepts of self-consciousness and dialectics. This enables their common influence in *Truth and Method* by Hans-Georg Gadamer.

I explain H.s claim in the „Sense-Certainty“ chapter of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the object of sense certainty is a ‘this-such,’ as opposed to a mere ‘this’. I relate H.s claim to Wilfrid Sellars’s interpretation of Kantian intuitions as having the structure of a ‘this-such’, thereby containing both a demonstrative and a conceptual moment. Sellars motivates this claim entirely by appeal to the particular structure of Kant’s transcendental psychology. In „Sense-Certainty“ H. offers us what Sellars and Kant do not: a general argument for the claim that our most immediate cognitive contact with objects in the world cannot be an unstructured demonstrative immediacy, a pure ‘this’, but must be construed to have the structure of a ‘this-such’.

The purpose of this paper is to stress the common characteristics of H.ian and Rawlsian thoughts. It is shown that H. and Rawls have similar objectives, since they both attempt to determine the possibility condition of the reconciliation of the reasonable and the rational, of the universal and the particular. They share a similar concern, which integrates but tries to overcome the Kantian one: their works examine how political freedom can be achieved and how an empirical and implementable theory can be built.
Espinoza Lolas, Ricardo A.: Arte y religion en la „Phänomenologie des Geistes“ de Hegel a la luz de la „Wissenschaft der Logik“. [Kunst und Religion in Hegels „Phäno-

From its beginning, the H.ian thought understood that art was not a radical way to access in the ‘absolute’. What we seek here is to show how this idea was articulated in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. So it is possible to see that all later H.ian thoughts proceed from these assumptions. The ‘abs-
olute’ – understood from his dialectic – acquires a unique sense in the history of thought. Actually, art is not annihilated, but assimilated in a specific kind of religion: namely Greek religion.


This essay aims at illustrating Arendt’s references to H.ian thought, from the perspective of a rethinking of the dialectic. By means of an analysis of such writings as The Life of the Mind, the author shows that Arendt grasps in the dialectical development of H.s thought some „libertarian“ implications, i.e., the fecundity of the human thoughts and actions, as against more conventional interpretations which regard dialectic as an unchangeable chain of thoughts and events. Denying that the outcome of the dialectical process may be the end of history, Arendt extracts the meaning of history and historical analysis by grafting on them the practice of narration, in order to recover a time of the men, where the very narration of the events – i.e., of the life, not of ideas or truths – reaches the level of the political analysis and political action by means of the bridge of the faculty of judgment.


I stage the question ‘What about dialectics?’ by showing Frantz Fanon’s insurrectionary fidelity to H. and his dialectic. Fanon is an acute and disloyal reader of H., and relentlessly probes the moment of negation in H.s dialectic to pry it open for an emancipatory, nonsublative politics of a ‘new hu-
manity’. Fanon’s attempts to side with the radical implications of otherness disclose the ‘subaltern moment’ in H.s dialectic and leave us a deformed H., profoundly equivocal and no longer easily named (hence, recognized) as the philosopher of synthesis and reconciliation.

Gutierrez, Carlos B.: Reconocimiento y unidad sistemico-especulativa en Hegel. [Anerkennung und systemisch-spekulative Einheit bei Hegel.] — In: Natureza Hu-

This paper is focused on the problem of recognition in H.s work, stressing that the principle of recognition does not intend a generalization of a special type of action or social relations, but indicates the structure of a formative process of both the individual and general conscience. Having covered the Jena Writings and the Phenomenology of Spirit, the paper goes to the First Book of the Science of Logic, showing the movement by which the logic of reflection reaches its decisive
point in the logical dissolution of the other. The analysis ends with the exhibition of a very special trend in H.'s system that returns in those passages of his philosophy of history which bear a clearly homogenizing trace.


The purpose of this article is to assess the epistemological significance of H.'s Phenomenology of Spirit as outlined in its preface and introduction. The first chapter sketches the function of the Phenomenology as an introduction to ‘true philosophical science’. The second chapter analyzes H.'s methodological anti-individualism, due to which the justification of knowledge cannot be accomplished by using the individual subject of epistemic certainty as a basic epistemic principle. The third chapter discusses H.'s arguments for a theory of epistemic justification: The first is an antiskeptical argument from the self-creation of the criterion of knowledge; the second is a constructive argument from the history of self-consciousness that makes up the methodological frame for the entire Phenomenology. The article’s conclusion is that H. makes an important systematic contribution to epistemology.


The author suggests that H. translated elements of the Aristotelian logical mechanism into philosophical concepts. The author also suggests H. modified Kantian spatial groups onto temporality. Other topics include H.'s idealism, categories, and symbolic logic.


This text considers the results of the Western powers’ recognition of Kosovo’s independence from three perspectives: firstly, the possible consequences (of which what is happening in Georgia already gives us some proof) of this independence proclaimed and recognised outside the provisions of international law, and which can be considered a precedent in other territories with similar problems; secondly, it proposes, following H., a rational conception of the state, far removed from ideas of ethnicity based on race, language, and so on, in which nationalism finds its inspiration. Finally, it analyses and criticises from the H.ian perspective, as updated by the reasoning of authors such as Habermas, the foundations of nationalism, especially its mistaken defence of the pre-eminence of collective over individual rights.


The article deals with the issue of modernity’s end. Against this background arise connections between H.'s philosophy and existential phenomenology. Herewith the concepts of postmodernism and Enlightenment are analyzed. The author pays attention to the different contents of the term „phenomenology” and to the different concepts of reality in the H.'s and Heidegger’s philosophy.
Nevertheless, the author distinguishes three sections common to H.s philosophy and to Heidegger’s thinking. These are: historicity, the creative principle and the dialectics of the beginning and the end. On the basis of these sections the author discusses the phenomenality as belonging to reality as created by us. The thesis of reality’s creation allows one, not only to connect H.s phenomenology and existential thinking, but also to interpret H. in the existential perspective.


The article aims at reconstructing the connection between the agent’s conscious identity and his orientation through categorically valid norms, as it is established in Fichte and H. It is through this connection that Fichte and H. wanted to develop further the Kantian idea of autonomy. While Fichte introduced the conception of normative identity within the framework of a theory of individual morality, H. transformed this idea in his conception of ethical identity, which is founded on society’s normative practice. It is argued that H., as a consequence of this, established a closer relation between identity and recognition than Fichte, who first introduced the conception of recognition in post-Kantian philosophy.


H. opposed biological evolution, yet aspects of his views can be exploited to lessen the distance between him and Darwin. H. accepted recent geological discoveries of immense time spans, wide changes, and fossil flora and fauna, but saw these as without philosophical interest, since his concern was the rationality of the basic features of the current natural world. But given H.s doctrines about the contingency of natural beings, plus his acceptance of long-term geological change, he could admit that biological species developed over time. What would separate him from Darwinism’s total contingency, however, would be his insistence on rationally unified forms for the large scale features of nature and organic systems. This essay discusses these issues and develops an account of the relation of logical necessities to natural powers and contingent events.


Focusing on the political thought of Schelling and H. – beginning with the early texts (1796–1802), then moving briefly to H.s well known Philosophy of Right (1821) – this essay revisits the Romantic-Idealist theory of the organic state by returning to its genesis in the turbulent political, cultural and scientific debates of the post-Revolutionary period. Given the controversial nature of its historical (mis-)appropriations, the organic idea of the state has become synonymous with totality and closure. This essay argues, however, that the contemporary rejection of organismism relies on narrow interpretations of Romantic and Idealist notions of organic life, interpretations that fail to do justice to the complex organismic philosophies emerging in the early nineteenth century. In order to move beyond the Enlightenment idea of a contractual state, H. and Schelling read the political through the organic. What gets carried over in this translation is not simply a logical principle of organic unity, but the entire system of relations that comprise organismic life. Departing from the Kantian concept of the organic, where parts are regulated by the whole, H.
and Schelling open their systems of thought, consciously or not, to more organismic forces. The organismic refers to uncontrollable forces within the organism, such as illness, disease and death, which run counter to the whole. Instead of viewing the organic in strictly metaphorical terms, Schellings and H.s concept of political life maintains a relation to the overdetermined genetic and biological processes of the organism, material processes that unsettle totalized structures.


This paper deals with the idea of presuppositionless philosophy, thereby focusing on Husserl and H. While striving to realize this age-old idea, they adopt different strategies, based on epistemological foundationalism and coherentism respectively. Husserl follows the Cartesian tradition to search for an indubitable foundation and absolute beginning on which to build a rigorous system of knowledge. H., however, rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge or presuppositionless beginning, and maintains that the characterization of presuppositionlessness can only be applied to the system as a whole. After briefly reviewing Descartes’s foundationalist idea, the paper examines Husserl’s attempt to realize it through his phenomenological method. It then proceeds to analyze H.s criticism of the demand of an absolute foundation, explaining how he reinterprets the idea of presuppositionlessness in his speculative philosophy. The paper ends with some remarks on Husserl’s later development.


This article investigates the influence of constitutional debates emerging from the Prussian reform movement, 1810–19, on H.s theory of the modern constitutional state, as articulated in the Philosophy of Right. I argue that H.s theory, which combined constitutional monarchy with a scheme of corporate representation in assembled estates, was not simply a product of an abstract rationalist philosophy but rather, a deeply ideological vision of the medieval origins of modern Germany. In reconstructing the intellectual context of the Prussian “Verfassungsfrage,” I illustrate how H. carved out a middle way between the political thought of the Prussian reformers, such as Chancellor Hardenberg and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and the feudal reactionaries, or Junkers, who eventually derailed the programme of constitutional reform.


H.s account of habit plays a vital, though often overlooked, role in his philosophical anthropology as well as his ethical thought. Although first introduced in relation to basic physical capacities, habituation reappears in his account of language and in the unconscious appropriation of ethical life. Because acting out of habit is not acting freely, our freedom depends upon the ability to reflect consciously on our habits – which for H. requires articulating them in language. Contrasting H. with Bourdieu on the expressibility of practices, I argue that H.s view is more optimistic than Bourdieu’s yet more sober than it first appears.
Nachträge zum Berichtszeitraum 2008


According to H., Spinozism is a pantheistic system of abstract identity, where all the differences are dissolved in the absolute substance. His reproaches refer to the system’s lack of the concept of negation of negation, the immobility of the substance, and its inability to relate its ontological degradation back to itself. While the first reproach is quite justified, the latter two are not, for Spinozism is precisely an attempt to think movement and the relationship between the finite and the infinite without resorting to ontological hierarchy and negation. H.s understanding of the absolute substance is therefore more relevant in reference to the question of how his own system of thought is put in motion, and so the phrase Spinozism, in H., often simply stands for the immediate unity of being and thought. Thus, the final part of the article is dedicated to ontotheology and the concept of „causa sui,“ drawing a line between H.s and Spinoza’s philosophical strategy on this issue. While H. based his progressive system on the Kantian critique of ontotheological unity of the formal level of being with the objective level of thought, Spinozist conception of the absolute substance can perhaps be successfully explained with a reference to Heidegger’s conception of „Dasein. “


My present aim is to establish the need for an investigation into the relationship of Lonergan’s critical realism to H.s absolute idealism and to outline generally the strategy to be employed in going
beyond absolute idealism. Such an investigation is, for reasons I shall provide, especially important for the future of Lonergan studies and, I think, long overdue.


In this paper I examine H.s notion of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ and ask whether the book of Ecclesiastes can be considered an adequate illustration of this stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit. I contend that Ecclesiastes can be used to illuminate the themes found in this section and can thus supply H.s readers with a biblical narrative that sheds light on this difficult text. While this portion of the Phenomenology need not be read in religious terms, many commentators have used Judeo-Christian themes to frame H.s account. I will draw on such commentaries (Hyppolite, Findlay, Verene) to bolster my claim. Such a task also brings to light H.s remarks concerning revealed religion just prior to absolute knowing.

Orman, Enver: Platon’un Ruhu ve Hegel’in Geist. [Plato’s Soul and Hegel’s Geist.] — In: Yeditepe’dede Felsefe. [Philosophy at Yeditepe.] İstanbul. 7 (2008), 53, 15–46.

Plato’s conception of soul and his analysis of body-soul relation are important to understand his idealism. In Plato’s philosophy the radical difference between soul and body reflects on his whole system and plays a determining role on the problematic relationship between the world of appearances and the ideas. Opposed to that, in H.s philosophy the relation of body and soul has a more concrete and dialectical nature and this dialectical perspective determines the monist character of his absolute idealism. For H. soul is only the first level of spirit as being conscious rationality. The nature which also includes our body, is the only environment for existence of soul and soul exactly forms its consciousness and spirituality by means of this nature which constitutes its otherness and externality.


In this study, I try to show that the philosophy of H. was not impressed by a dialectician of antiquity such as Zeno and Plato, but also ontology and metaphysics of Aristotle had a great deal of influence on his philosophy as well. To explore this issue, I firstly compare Aristotelian metaphysics, ontology and logic to H.ian dialectics. Secondly, I show similarities between Aristotle and H. on this subject. Finally, I try to support the idea that H.ian dialectics of concept is a synthesis of ideas of Plato and Aristotle by exposing W.T. Stace, Herbert Marcuse and Allen W. Wood’s relevant ideas on this very subject.


Franz Kafka’s novella The Metamorphosis (1912) provides an analogy for a consideration of the process of teacher identity formation and performance. Gregor Samsa awoke to find himself
transformed into a giant beetle. He faced a complete loss of identity as he lost connection with the micro-political space that formed the context of his former role performances. Teachers face an analogous situation. Within the context of institutional role scripts and political influences, do teachers choose to become determined by outside forces rendering them incapable of change? Do they forfeit their rights and responsibilities within society? Or, do teachers, through positive action within discursive practices, express their freedom and their self-consciousness by recognizing their ethical responsibility to serve society? H. provides a framework within which to consider the potential responses to these questions. Teachers have a choice to make: surrender or act. An examination of the development of teacher identity is presented utilizing the lens of Kafka’s *The Metamorphosis* and H.s *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Pérez Cortés, Sergio: El pensamiento libre y la razón en la „Fenomenología del espíritu” de Hegel. [Das freie Denken und die Vernunft in Hegels „Phänomenologie des Geistes“.] — In: Revista de Filosofía. Mexico. 40 (2008), 121, 125–150.

The 200th anniversary of the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has allowed us to reconsider the true aims of the project of H.s absolute idealism, which was undertaken within the book. In this light, this text will try to show that H.s ‘programme’ fits squarely and in perfect continuity with Kant’s philosophical critique, and pushes it to its utmost consequences. Indeed, for H., reason is free since it is the unity of reflection about external objects (the infamous thing-in-itself) and critical reflection of thought upon itself. Reason (or concept) is free, not because acting independent from external things, but rather because it includes absolute determination regarding those objects, and a full understanding of the thought that makes such determination possible.


In the following, the author argues that H.s speculative idealism attempts to reconcile the competing philosophical positions of idealism and realism. Through an examination, first, of current scholarship and, second, of H.s critique of the „Ideal of Pure Reason” in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, the author shows that one of H.s main criticisms is that the exclusion of the thing-in-itself denies realism. The author argues that H.s response to the problem of the thing-in-itself is to affirm realism. The author concludes by demonstrating how H.s concept of „Geist” reconciles idealism and realism.


In the chapter „Observing Reason” of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* H. discusses the naturalistic and scientistic theories of the mind of his times. In a close analysis of the text it is shown that H.s arguments are still of systematical philosophical interest although the theories he criticises are regarded as obsolete today. It is shown in which way H. analyses and criticises the distinction of „inner“ and „outer“ on the one hand and demonstrates that and why the concept of law essential for natural sciences cannot be used to make intelligible the relation between mind and brain. The central point of H. is that the methodological premises of observing reason, being constitutive for natural sciences, make it impossible to give a satisfying account of the relation of mind and nature. This way, so I argue, H.s critique is still of importance for today’s debates in the philosophy of mind.

H. argues that modernity lacks the substantive ties that are central to the opposition in Antigone. Kierkegaard’s and Butler’s interpretations respond by answering why the problems that the ancient tragedy raises are still problems for modernity.


This article contrasts H. and David Hume’s accounts of sensing as pure immediacy. Pure immediacy describes the ideal of objectivity where sensing occurs without input from the subject: sensing as immediate reception of the given. For Hume, pure immediacy provokes a skeptical crisis. Philosophy responds to the crisis only to remain entrenched in subjectivism. H. challenges pure immediacy and subjectivism. Nothing answers to the description of pure sensation. With the collapse of pure sensing, the flip-flop between the purely subjective and objective gives way to a recovery of the world, anticipating Martin Heidegger, Donald Davidson, and Frank Farrell.


The aim of this paper is to examine Heidegger’s critique of H. and to determine whether it is justified. Heidegger claims that H. tried to reduce everything to a single absolute entity, to the absolute knowing subject. The result is the identification of being and nothing, as H. formulates it at the beginning of his Logic. H. identifies being with nothing because being has no references, no predicates, no properties. Heidegger agrees with H. that being and nothing are the same, but in completely different respects. They are the same because only entity actually exists, i.e., as an existent being. But Being itself does not exist, and should be conceived in an utterly different way from entity. And since Being cannot „be“ it is a nonentity and therefore nothing.


Based on the assumption that the study of public values cannot neglect the wider purposes of administration in society, this article discusses the diverging views of Weber and H. on the relationship between bureaucracy and freedom. They provide interesting Continental-European alternatives to the standard, liberal account so dominant in America. Although their accounts of bureaucracy are superficially similar, their conceptions of freedom radically differ, due to deep divergences in their political philosophies. While Weber has a concept of freedom as existentialist choice on top of classical liberal freedoms, H. instead has a more social concept of freedom. While Weber is particularly aware of the danger of „Beamtenherrschaft“ (domination by officials), H. offers a constitutionalist account of the relationship between bureaucracy and freedom, and leaves much room for the notion of public values.
Türkyılmaz, Çetin: The Motion of Thought in Hegel. — In: Yeditepe'de Felsefe. [Philosophy at Yeditepe.] İstanbul. 7 (2008), 53, 67–79.

In this paper H.s concepts of „Aufhebung,” recollection („Erinnerung”) and absolute knowledge will be taken up, especially within the framework of Heidegger’s criticism and a comparison will be made between the thought of Heidegger and that of H.


While not an explicit claim of H.s, this paper aims to use his analysis of ‘Conscience’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit to demonstrate that the conflict between different moral judgments is morally necessary. That is, rather than being the unfortunate result of ‘hard’ cases, I argue that moral conflict is a necessary condition for the possibility of duty. Grasping the moral ground of moral conflict, I contend, allows us to understand why such conflicts arise, how and why they become entrenched into ‘moral issues’ and what our duties are in such cases. Thus, I aim to articulate both the moral necessity and dutiful resolution of seemingly intractable moral conflicts.


H.s idealism and his epistemology have been seriously misunderstood due to various deep-set preconceptions of H.s expositors. These preconceptions include: Idealism is inherently subjective; H.s epistemology invokes intellectual intuition; H. was not much concerned with natural science; Natural science has no basic role to play in H.s Logic. In criticizing these notions, I highlight four key features of H.s account of intelligence: (1) Human cognition is active, and forges genuine cognitive links to objects that exist and have intrinsic characteristics, regardless of what we may think, believe, or say about them; (2) The „Denkbestimmungen“ that structure and thus characterize worldly objects and events can only be grasped by intelligence (not merely by consciousness); (3) Intelligence obtains genuine objectivity by correctly identifying characteristics of a known object; (4) Central to our intelligent comprehension of „Denkbestimmungen“ is natural scientific investigation. These findings show that H.s Logic is much more closely tied with Naturphilosophie and with natural science than is commonly supposed. I conclude with eight hermeneutical pointers for understanding H.s writings.


The article focuses on H.s analysis of Greek and contemporary statuary. It specifically refers to the word „detail,” which, according to H., is intimately linked to the sphere of the fine arts. The article shows how detail is linked to the measurement of the human figure, in particular to the size of its feet. In spite of the numerous details that the H.s book Aesthetik evokes, the absence of „detail” as a speculative concept is a distinctive trait of H.s work. H.s use of it is not very frequent, and seems rather cursory, although he uses it at least in one case as the substantive of the verb „detaillieren,” namely, „Detaillierung.”

The logical investigation of thinking must not be confused with inquiry into the mental reality of thought, which properly falls within the philosophy of mind. H. provides an important, but much neglected contribution towards accounting for the psychological conditions of reason by detailing in his ‘philosophy of subjective spirit’ how intelligence can progress from representation to thought. By thinking through H.’s argument, we can comprehend why thinking is a matter of intelligence rather than consciousness, why representation cannot provide the universality of conceptualization, and how semiotic imagination enables intelligence to leave representation behind and enter the domain of thought, unencumbered by the opposition of consciousness. Through this result, the philosophy of mind can account for the psychological conditions of its own theorizing.


Even though H. rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm. What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to the infinite Being. The Lectures in its central treatment of the Cosmological proof present us with an explanation in rational terms of the fact of religion, i.e., the elevation of the finite spirit to infinite God, rather than with a proof in a narrow logical sense. H. is not so much asking the question ‘Does God exist?’ but rather ‘How is the elevation of the finite spirit to God possible?’ The H.ian ‘proof,’ I argue, consists in a demonstration of the necessity of movement from finiteness to infinity, that is, the demonstration of the necessity of religion itself. Religious faith in this context is not juxtaposed to reason, but appears as a mode of imperfect knowledge, which is superseded by the further development of the rational concept.