Minds of Humans and Other Animals |
Classification, Categorization and Animals’ Minds |
| Ruth Adam |
| Animals are able to classify, i.e., to group similar objects into a single group. There are few levels of classification ranging from a mere discrimination to the understanding of abstract relations. In this talk I will first define the different classification levels and show how a careful distinction between those levels can help to solve questions regarding the rationality of animals. I will then proceed with a focus on categorization and discuss its possible mechanisms. |
Bowerbirds, Early Hominids and the Art World |
| Gregory Currie |
| For those willing to allow us a pan-cultural notion of art, the question of when art began is a difficult and important one. One answer is that it began with the cultural "big bang", about 35,000 years ago. On the other hand, we might be impressed by the activity of much earlier hominids who produced highly symetrical, carefully worked and—according to some—useless hand axes and cleavers. Should we count this as artistic activity also? Even if we don't go that far we may want to count this as continuous with the activity we call art, making it a significant precursor to full-scale artistic activity, and certainly something that lies within the domain of "aesthetic production". But then what are we to say about the activity of very distant species such as bowerbirds? I examine some of the evidence concerning bower construction, which reveals some striking parallels with what we know or guess concerning Acheulean stone tool manufacture. There is also evidence—not conclusive—that bower construction is in part a cultural activity. Are we now to say that birds have art, or something close to it? I struggle to answer this question … |
Representation of Relationships by Animals |
| John Pearce |
| Adult humans are readily able to appreciate abstract relationships between two objects. They can identify which one is the larger, and also comment on whether one is to the left of right of the other. Premack (1983) argued that this ability to comprehend relationships depends upon a capacity for abstract thought. In order to assess whether animals are capable of abstract thought, a series of experiments will be described which attempt to determine if animals can solve discriminations based on the abstract relationship between two objects. Premack, D. (1983). The codes of man and beasts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, 125-167. |
The Development of Individual and Collective Intentionality in Infants and Apes |
| Hannes Rakoczy |
| The development of different forms of intentionality will be discussed from ontogenetic and comparative points of view. While human infants and other animal species (notably great apes) develop some simple first and second-order intentionality early on, only human infants move from there to develop abilities of collective or “We” intentionality. Recent research into the early ontogeny of such collective intentionality, particularly in the domain of joint play, will be reviewed. |
Thoughts in Non-Linguistic Animals |
| Gottfried Vosgerau |
| I will argue that the traditional philosophical thesis of language-dependency of thoughts is wrong. I will then present a definition of thoughts that does not refer to linguistic abilities or linguistic contents. This definition is then applied to three different cases of non-linguistic animal behavior: the homing behavior of ants, spatial orientation capacities of rats, and the categorizing abilities of the grey parrot Alex. It will be argued that ants have no thoughts, rats probably have thoughts, and Alex surely has thoughts. The case of rats will serve to discuss the theoretical value of the definition proposed. |