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Is the Content of Perceptual Experience Non-conceptual?

The content view of nonconceptual content defines the nonconceptual content of perceptual representations as a distinct type of content than the conceptual content of higher cognitive representations. In this paper, I will analyze two different arguments in support of the content view: The first, proposed by Richard Heck, holds that nonconceptual representations do not satisfy the Generality Constraint. The second is based on the cognitive impenetrability of perception. I will argue that both arguments fail to show that the content of conscious perceptual experience is nonconceptual. I will conclude that, at best, one can argue for sub-personal perceptual representations having nonconceptual content.

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