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Is Episodic Memory a Propositional Attitude?

The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and whether it has propositional content, have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. However, in one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Jordi Fernandez (2006) defends this view by arguing that it provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Alex Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against this tendency, I argue that episodic memory is not a propositional attitude, and therefore, that it does not have propositional content. My project here is mainly critical. I show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory.