Prof. Dr. Sven Bernecker  
(University of California, Irvine)

Memory, Mind, and Meaning  
June 17. Since memory implies neither belief nor justification, remembering that p doesn’t imply knowing that p. Though memory doesn’t imply justification and knowledge it can function both as a preservative and a generative source of justification and knowledge. To preserve justification and knowledge, memory must preserve content. Since memory contents are determined by relations the subject bears to his past physical or social environment (rather than by states internal to the subject) the ability to remember is affected by changes in the environment. Another factor affecting the ability to remember is the creative transformation of stored contents. A memory content need not be the same as, but only similar to, the content of the representation from which it causally derives. Diachronic content similarity can be defined in terms of the entailment relation.

Memory, Machines, and Matter  
June 24. Memory contents in the third-person mode leave open the issue of the personal identity. Yet, when a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer be numerically the same as the one who had the original representation. The dependence of memory on personal identity is of a contingent rather than a logical kind. Memory is a special case of quasi-memory. Quasi-memory is defined in terms of the memory content corresponding to, and being causally related to, the content of representation someone had in the past. The causal condition says that remembering something requires standing in the appropriate causal relation to the relevant past representation. A distinction needs to be made between the causal dependence of a memory on that which retains the past representation. This distinction is crucial for discerning cases of remembering from instances where some content is learned anew rather than recalled.