experimention and variation as style to be a matter of living per se, rather than of living as a writer. Style is what makes for singularisation rather than individualisation in our lives. It is a way of seeing concrete individual lives as having their own particular patterns of unfolding that are outside of a notion of bounded subjectivity, of the person as the author of their own existence. Rather we are the stylists of our own existence. In this sense, Deleuze’s notion of style is of a piece with Foucault’s technique du bien, or art of living. If a life is a matter of immanence, then the life is a matter of style.

We opened this chapter by remarking on how Roland Barthes’ comments on the Death of the Author have been taken as a prohibition on discussing the relation between the life of a given individual and the work they create, or even the talk they utter. The subject is dissolved in the undulating weave of discourse. Deleuze rescues us from this unfortunate limit on our thinking. Through the categories of life, style, assemblage, actual and virtual, Deleuze maps out complex relationships between the singular aspects of our lived experience without at any point seeking to reintroduce a bounded consciousness in which this is gathered together. There can be no Deleuzian psychogogy, but there can be a form of psychological enquiry which takes the astonishing creative world unfolded by Deleuze, with its affects and intensities, spurs of life and experiments with self-stylisation as its object.

...[D] is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards catastrophe. Staying stratified – organized, signified, subjectified – is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demised or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 161)

The Dimension of Vitality

In this book we have explored the possibilities of a ‘second-order’ psychology committed to the idea that we must reflexively create our own foundations. This reflexive foundationalism, however, goes ‘all the way down’. That is to say, we must create our foundations in the context of an emotional, social, organic and material environment that is no less self-founding. We begin this conclusion by identifying a theme common to all of the thinkers and topics we have addressed in this book. This theme can be summarised as follows: whether one has consciously realised it or not, to live, to act, to think and to talk one must constantly negotiate a position between two impossible extremes of unrepeatable chaos and redundant order. These two extremes form the poles of what could be called a dimension of vitality. Any ‘art of life’ must find its way in the space/time of this dimension. If the creative (not) foundationalism that we have argued for in this book confronts the paradox that groundless being must create its own grounds, then it must do so as part of, and within the parameters of, the dimension of vitality.
Unrepeatable chaos

At one extreme, there is the chaotic and buzzing non-space of possibilities. Artists are well aware of this chaotic non-space since art, of all human endeavours, gets closest to it. Turner points it in his masterpieces of tumultuous seas of light. In singing of Van Gogh, Joni Mitchell invokes the notion of turbulent indigo. Johnny Cash invokes a burning ring of fire. That most artistic of psychologists, William James, spoke of a 'blooming, buzzing confusion'. Patti Smith, the poet, sings of the 'sea of possibilities'. No life is possible in the buzzing confusion of the sea of possibilities, and yet life - nature itself - is born from the primordial soup of that turbulent sea of noise and fury. A complete return to that sea spells certain death: death by chaos. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 161) describe it in the opening quotation it results in the return of the strata as a form which is 'heavier than ever'. For this reason, as Whitehead points out (1927-8/1985, p. 96), Chaos has traditionally been associated with evil. In book II of Paradise Lost, for instance, Milton describes Satan's journey across Chaos in which he discovers:

The secrets of the hoary deep; a dark
Illimitable ocean, without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth and hight,
And time and place are lost, where eldest Night.
And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal anarchy amidst the noise
Of endless wars, and by confusion stand.

But despite these negative, Satanic associations, we are also dimly aware that if we stray too far from this illimitable and anarchic ocean, our life loses its meaning and its creativity. Time, place and dimension may well be lost in it, but they are also born from it. It is our source: ancestors of Nature. In crossing Chaos, Satan left a permanent track. This track is a trace of order - a trail which might be followed by other demons in a preliminary gesture of repetition or pattern amongst the anarchy.

Redundant order

On the other hand, at the other extreme, there is the static total space of complete redundancy where nothing but the monotonous repetition of the same brute reality is possible. No life is possible in this frozen, stratified, nonmoving space of redundancy. The rule of the rule rules supreme. Creativity - the possibility of the new is at a minimum, and it is snuffed out altogether. The sense organ presented with repetition of the same ceases to sense.

This continuum of vitality has been felt in one form or another at least since the pronouncements of the pre-Socratic sages Heraclitus and Parmenides. Great thinkers have long been more or less dimly aware of it and many have particularised it in dualistic terms. Nietzsche distinguished the Dionysian from the Apollonian; Bergson distinguished life from matter; Freud distinguished the

instinct of life from that of death. It seems that we risk destruction from two sides: from the side of unrepeatable chaos, and from the side of redundant order. Imagine a surfer who must constantly negotiate a position between zones too calm and still to carry the board, and zones so rough and unpredictable that no stability is possible. The becoming of the surfer is inseparable from the becoming of the wave. Perhaps we are all surfers in the dimension of vitality.

It is important to emphasise that, for any given individual, both extremes mean death. Amongst other things, death is: a) the one thing we can be certain of; and b) not something we can actually experience, since it marks the end of our experience. A corollary of the statement that both extremes of the continuum of vitality mean death can therefore be stated, quite emphatically: we can have no experience of these two extremes. We cannot know them empirically. They mark two limits of experience. It follows that we are always already in the middle of these possible non-experiences. We are thrown, as Heidegger put it, and then swim, in the milky or medium of the dimension of vitality. Such is our destiny. But then death is not the end of the world.

In sum, we are creatures of a process of creation that did not begin with us and will not end with us. Each new phase of creation must take the results of the previous phase as its artistic medium. This is why we have placed such emphasis in the latter part of the book (particularly in the chapters on Foucault and Deleuze) on the notion of the art of living, a topic which is largely ignored by psychology or consigned to the 'pop psychology' shelves. Aim and value are inescapable aspects of psychology once being is construed in relation to becoming, and ethics becomes a very real project of the coordination and harmonisation of personal and collective existence.

Interestingly enough, the theme of the art of living was also a significant concern for Whitehead, who took issue with the doctrine of evolution that sees on the idea that life is essentially a struggle for existence in which the fittest eliminate the less fit (a doctrine that has risen to new prominence via 'evolutionary psychology'). For Whitehead (1929/1958, p. 4), the fallacy of such evolutionary thinking lies not in the belief of the 'survival of the fittest' (a fact that is 'obvious' and 'stares us in the face'), but in the belief that 'fitness for survival is identical with the best exemplification of the Art of Life'. 'Life', Whitehead points out, is quite deficient in survival value. The art of persistence, he states, is 'to be dead', since 'only inorganic things persist for great lengths of time'. The art of living, by contrast, concerns the active modification of one's environment, and the more sophisticated the organism, the more actively it transforms its surroundings. When it comes to us human beings, this transformation and creation of the environment becomes the most prominent fact in our existence. The art of life thus concerns this active relation to the environment, and it can be summarised as a three-fold urge:

[i] to live, [ii] to live well, [iii] to live better. In fact, the art of life is first to be alive, secondly to be alive in a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire an increase in satisfaction. (ibid., p. 8)
As we stressed in the previous chapter, this task must be distinguished from the narrowly individualistic dogma of the humanistic psychology movement in which we are invited to 'self-actualise'. The art of living ultimately cannot be dissociated from the social life of the collectivity, and here Spinoza and Deleuze's notion of impersonal beatitude becomes directly relevant. If we were pushed to sum up in a single phrase what it is that we consider to be the point or aim of a second-order psychology, we might adapt Whitehead and say the following: the function of a psychology without foundations is the promotion of the art of life.

Pipe Dreams

This book is a response to what we think of as the pressing need to replace the dogma of reductionist materialism that still grips psychology with a radical alternative that better fits the facts and better satisfies our intuitions. It is often said that psychology is still a young science, and this is used as an excuse for the fact that it has not matured into a hard science that resembles the grown-ups such as physics, chemistry and biology. But for how many decades can we continue to tell this story of promising youth? Psychology is no longer a young science. On the contrary, it seems to us that psychology has grown old before its time, but without the maturity and wisdom that should accompany the ageing process. Psychology has been denied its phase of childish play, imagination and wonder. It has been denied this through a combination of two factors. On the one hand, there has been an idolisation and emulation of a positivistic image of those sciences which came before it and stimulated its development. On the other hand, there has been a socially imposed practical demand for knowledge and techniques that can be deployed in the never-ending quest for social control and progress. In our experience, any creativity not stifled by the dead hand of positivism is typically crushed by the premature responsibilities imposed by a short-term pragmatism. Psychology must rediscover its lost youth. It must, above all, expand its imagination, its creativity. We wish the discipline of psychology to fall in love once again with its subject matter. We encourage it to take some time out, to smoke a pipe, to dream. But what is its subject matter? What is the psyche? What is experience? How do these things relate to the human being more generally, and to our forms of activity? In our experience such questions are almost never to be heard uttered within departments of psychology.

In this book we have argued against the tendency to try to ‘pin’ the psyche down in some definitive manner. In place of this ‘Ahah-function’ we have introduced an ‘Ishmael-function’ the key note of which is to follow our subject matter wherever it appears to go, to note its unpredictable transformations and its complex relations. Instead of dismissing the complexities of process, relationality and mediation we have placed these centre stage and we have drawn upon theorists whose work can help us in this task. With Artaud and Spinoza, for example, we have seen that the psychic does not begin with biological embodiment and it does not end with biological embodiment, and yet it has a decisively important relation with physiology. With Bergson and Deleuze we have seen that perception, duration and life are bound up with the complex forms of temporality associated with relations between the virtual and the actual, the possible and the real. And with Luhmann and Foucault we have seen that the psychic does not begin with society and it does not end with society, and yet it has a relation with society from which it ought not to be entirely abstracted.

One difficulty with these kinds of ideas, of course, is that they are rather abstract and hence difficult to grasp into a convenient ‘take-home-message’. One is left with what can sometimes feel like a cloud of smoke that drifts away, having subtly changed the smell, taste and appearance of the local atmosphere. What is a cloud of smoke? What can be done with it? Without something more substantial, the prospect of making some difference to the discipline of psychology remains a mere pipe dream. If only there were something more solid, like the firm wooden pipe from which the smoke slowly rises. In English, when we wish to confront someone disagreeable with a brute fact of experience that cannot be wished away, we sometimes utter the phrase ‘stick that in your pipe and smoke it!’ If only the totality of the brute facts of our experience could be stuck into a pipe and smoked. If only the powers of affective existence and the images, tastes, scents, sounds and sensations of perceptual encounters and the propositions of cognitive processes and conceptual thought and the enunciations of discourse could be bound up in one memorable pipe! Perhaps it can. Surreal things can come in dreams.

This is a Pipe

In the 1920s Rene Magritte created his well-known painting Ceil n’est pas une pipe. This famous artwork shows a carefully rendered image of a pipe beneath which Magritte painted a sentence that in English would read 'this is not a pipe'. Much ink has been devoted to this rather tongue-in-cheek work, including an interesting little book by Michel Foucault (1982) in which the author ruminates over the difference between the 'visible' and the 'articulable'. But how are we to interpret the artwork's statement 'this is not a pipe' in the light of our book?

A first way of interpreting it is to diverge from Foucault (1982, p. 19) by drawing a distinction between what we call power and image (as should become clear, the actual words chosen are less relevant than the concepts they mark). That is to say, the image of the pipe that we see on Magritte's canvas is evidently not a pipe in the sense of something which we can fill with tobacco, light and smoke. There is, hence, a very easy commonsensical distinction to be drawn between the causally efficacious aspects of an entity (let us mark that causal efficacy with the word power) and an entity considered as an image.
Although this distinction, badly handled, might risk the recreation of a ‘reality/representation’ binary, we nevertheless think it is worth making. The point is not to deny that the image of a pipe has powers of its own (and hence is no less real than any real pipe), but to maintain a distinction which might then allow us to recognise that the powers of a painted image are not identical to those of the pipe that might have served as Magritte’s model. In the light of Chapter 6 we leave it to the reader to list the affects both pipes might be capable of.

A second way of interpreting it is to add another distinction which we will mark with the word proposition. We wish to distinguish the pipe qua proposition from the pipe qua power and image. By the word proposition we wish to indicate a distinction between something actual and something potential. In the simplest terms, a proposition does not denote something that is but rather something that might be. It is what Whitehead described as a “lure for feeling.” A proposition is hence not first of all something linguistic (which is not to deny that language greatly amplifies the capacity to propose) but rather something conceptual. The pipe considered as a proposition is no more a pipe than the pipe considered as image. The painting, however, provokes those of us who have the patience to reflect upon the ‘concept’ of pipe and its possible meanings and relations. We thus have two distinct ways in which Magritte’s phrase ‘this is not a pipe’ might be understood. The conceptual proposition of a pipe is distinct from the image of a pipe is distinct from the causally efficacious pipe that has the power to be filled with tobacco, lit and smoked.

A third way of interpreting it is to draw one last distinction by attending to the linguistic level of the actual words and punctuation that together form the sentence ‘this is not a pipe’. Evidently the painted word ‘this’ is not something we might mistake for a pipe, and equally evidently the sentence Ceci n’est pas une pipe is not a pipe. It is as difficult to smoke those words as to smoke the conceptual proposition or the image. We now have three distinct ways in which this is not a pipe. The linguistic enunciation is distinct from the conceptual proposition is distinct from the image, and all are distinct from the causally efficacious pipe of power. We will mark this last distinction, which draws attention to the domain of communication, with the word enunciation.

Power, image, proposition and enunciation give us four initial letters that together do indeed sum to a pipe of sorts. Together, our four pipes give us the psyche stuffed in a pipe, or at least a mnemonic device for it. That is to say, we wish to suggest that, suitably understood, they cover the full domain of experience. Power and image can be considered as the two distinguishable modes of perception that Whitehead identifies in Process and reality as ‘causal efficacy’ and ‘presensational immediacy’. In the first mode we perceive our thoroughly embodied and thoroughly temporal affective relation to the world, whilst the second deals with the predominantly spatial affair of sensory perception. It is important to stress that the word ‘image’ arbitrarily emphasises vision (since in our sample we are dealing with a painting), but that this category should include all modes of sense perception. Proposition and enunciation, by contrast, can be considered conceptual modes that operate with meaning. We are affected, we sense, we think and we talk: affect, perceive, concept, discourse.

These modes are also closely related in that they grow out of one another, and – developmentally and evolutionarily – as a new mode appears, it both inherits from and transforms its predecessor. As we suggested earlier, images too have their ‘powers’ in that they generate and are generated by real worldly activity – by real effects and affects. More specifically, the imagistic mode of sensory perception presupposes more primordial forms of affective power as a parasite presupposes its host. The eye is first of all a mediator by which an organism can affect its own body through being affected by changing patterns of light. Propositions and enunciations are likewise causally efficacious in their own domains of abstraction (hence the function of concepts and the pragmatics of discourse), which in turn presuppose the continued existence of the abstracted-from background provided by the two forms of perception. The boundaries between the four modes are thus ultimately far from distinct and exclusive. Power is applicable to each of the other modes, but in a manner that is increasingly abstract and refined (the powers of sensory experience, the powers of conceptual proposition, the powers of discourse). This is because the modes emerge from one another in a veritable parasitical cascade: image presupposes power; proposition presupposes both image and power and the difference between them; enunciation presupposes proposition, image and power, and the differences between these. Each time the newly emergent mode works back upon its inheritance, transforming it into an environment optimally conducive to its own continuance as a power in the universe.

To remain consistent with the Whiteheadian notion of concern outlined in Chapter 2, and with the Bergsonian notion of flow outlined in Chapter 7, this pipe of experience must be split down the middle. The split is made by way of a distinction between experience (subject) and expression (superject) that applies equally to each mode. On the one side, power, image, proposition and enunciation are forms of experience, on the other side, they are forms of expression. Together, experience and expression enable process. That is to say, experience (an occasion of experience considered from its own private internal ‘subjective’ perspective) concerns the reception of data from past expressions, and expression (an occasion of experience considered from the public external ‘objective’ perspective of a new occasion) passes on data for future experiences.

The experience side of power is the capacity to be affected by other entities. The expression side of power points to the capacity to affect these other entities in turn.

Both aspects are essential to any definition of power. We are constituted by the ways in which others come into our experiences and, in turn, the ways in which we come into the experiences of others.
Turning to the next mode, the experience side of sensory perception concerns the reception of sense data or the objectification of the surrounding world in the form of sense perception (sounds, shapes and colours, sensations, tastes and smells).

The expression side of image, much as Bergson emphasised, concerns the motor corollaries to sensation that make up the sensori-motor couple and that, in the organisms that possess these higher forms of perception, harness the capacity to affect to the capacity to be affected by sensory perception.

Both aspects are essential to any definition of sensory experience.

With respect to conceptual propositions the experience side concerns the forms of reception we call understanding in contrast to the expressive moment of active reasoning.

Finally, with respect to enunciation we can distinguish the experience of listening (or reading) with the expressions of speaking (or writing).

Let us systematise these four modes of experience/expression a little further.

**Pipe 1: power**

The pipe that we smoke affects us in various ways and likewise is affected by us when filled, lit, smoked, emptied, and so on. It is thus related to us via a field of power relations. It enters into our experience affectively as a causally efficacious aspect of our world.

We use the word power in a Whiteheadian/Deleuzian sense to capture a sense of the world as a field of functional activity in which things are what they are by virtue of their activity in that world. For Bergson (1911/1998, p. 302), this is the ‘fluid continuity of the real’. The notion of power is thus integral to the idea of essential relationality (that things have relational essences). Things, in other words, are definable as their relevance to other things and in terms of the way other things are relevant to them. We noted that Spinoza defined power in this way in a two-fold manner as the capacity to affect other things and the capacity to be affected by other things. Likewise, Locke stated that power is to be conceived as a relation and as two-fold: ‘viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called “active,” and the other “passive.”’ (Whitehead, 1927–8/1985, p. 57). This twofold aspect is important to emphasise, and it corresponds broadly to the experience/expression distinction emphasised above whereby something is received or ‘taken in’ (experienced) and something is passed on (expressed). Following Whitehead’s principle of relativity whereby ‘it belongs to the nature of every “being” that it is a potential for every “becoming”’ (ibid., p. 45), we can grasp that one occasion of experience is an experience of the expressions of others. An occasion of expression is likewise data for the experiences of new occasions, and so forth. This whole field of interrelated activity is a field of power relations in which entities are affected by and affect one another in manifold ways. It is in this context that Whitehead speaks of causal efficacy and Deleuze speaks of affect (as distinct from percept and concept). Power is the basic mode of experience and expression and it is irrelevant to no form of experience or expression, no matter how high-grade, rarefied and sophisticated.

**Pipe 2: image**

In Magritte’s picture we merely see an image of the pipe as a collection of sense data (patterns of shape and colour) distributed spatially before us. Magritte’s pipe is not a pipe since, via the medium of his artwork, he has abstracted all but a semblance of the visual impression of a pipe. Abstraction has been a key concept throughout our book, and it remains key here (in Chapter 7, for instance, we discussed Bergson’s notion of the image as something ‘cut out’ from an ongoing ‘flow’). Abstraction abstracts from something more complete and more complex. But that from which the abstraction is made is rendered temporarily irrelevant and is accorded no further attention. Let us mark this ideal notion of completeness with the traditional philosophical distinction between ‘formal existence’ and ‘objective existence’. An entity can thus be considered as existing in its own ‘formal’ completeness (e.g. as an image from its own point of view) but also as existing ‘objectively’ as an expression in the experience of another. From the complete formal existence of something, a reduced sample is abstracted. The entity in its formal existence is thus objectified into the experience of another entity. The objectified entity can now be described in terms of its ‘objective existence’ (its existence as an object for another) rather than its ‘formal existence’. Abstraction thus abstracts something from out of a background. The background remains background and the abstraction alone is attended to and worked with. Abstraction is this process or gesture of isolating something from its background and attending to it or operating with it. Of all the ways that a pipe can affect us and be affected by us, we retain in Magritte’s picture only what we might call its ‘visual aspect’. We lose its feel in our hand, its smell and its taste, the way it might soothe or repulse us. In the same way, when we merely look at a pipe (even one we could pick up and smoke), we entertain that pipe only in so far as it is ‘objectified’ for us in visual form as something seeble. When we touch it or smell it, we objectify it in other distinctive ways.

But let us not forget that Magritte gives us a very detailed and realistic image of a pipe. It is not a piece of abstract art, like Matisse’s snail, which abstracts an absolute minimum of visual ‘sameness’ and leaves practically all of the visual details, let alone the rest, in the background. Via his ‘realism’, Magritte draws our attention to the fact that even if we were looking at a ‘real’ pipe, we would, in merely looking, still be dealing only with sensa or ‘percepts’ from the visual modality. That is to say, we would be dealing only with those objective aspects abstracted via the complex organic pathways of our visual system. Whether we are looking at a real pipe or at Magritte’s picture, we are
dealing in our experience with nothing more than a spatially arranged pattern of colours. There is nothing in what we are given that warrants the claim to have seen a pipe. We are in the domain of what Deleuze called *perceps* and with the mode of perception that Whitehead called *presentational immediacy*. In presentational immediacy the world is given in sense-presentation. Clearly, this way of objectifying the world is limited to sophisticated forms of animal life. The experience of lower organisms, in contrast, is dominated by the affective sense of causal efficacy that we are calling power. Perception in the mode of power is thus primordially dominant, and only secondarily does the world come to be objectified via sense data. As we touched upon in Chapter 7, Bergson (1911/1998, p. 204) articulates the difference between image and power in terms of a distinction between ‘surface’ and ‘depth’: ‘motionless on the surface, in its very depth it lives and vibrates’. Image is the comparatively superficial product of great complexity. It nevertheless dominates our consciousness with its definiteness and precision. And yet it is obviously a ‘show’ generated by our own bodily activity. All we need do is close our eyes and the image of the pipe disappears. But the clarity and distinctness of the image is always accompanied by a haunting sense of a deeper affective power to things, vague and imprecise and yet, somehow, indescribably important.

Imagine for a moment that the picture were so well crafted that we actually take it for a pipe, reach out for it, and find our hand bumping into the surface of the picture, disappointed, perhaps, that we will not be able to smoke. Power and image would here be out of sync. We would be confronted by what we described earlier as the difference between power and image. We would be like the fabled dog that dropped his meat through grasping at its tempting reflection in the still water of a lake. The dog too failed to coordinate image and power, and was confronted with their difference. The germ of consciousness is to be found in the confrontation with this difference.

**Pipe 3: proposition**

There is nothing in the play of colours arrayed before us in their immediacy that warrants our claim to have seen a pipe. Whether the image is a painting, a photograph, a mirror image of a pipe or a pipe in front of us may be entirely irrelevant to the question of the facticity of the sense perceptions arrayed before us during a given moment. What we see is not yet a ‘pipe’ but this array of colour and shape. That is to say, to see a ‘pipe’ is already to have taken the sense-presentation of the image as something else: i.e. not as an array of *sensas* but as a *pipe*. To take something as something else is to engage in symbolism. More specifically, it is to take the image as a *proposition*. It is to think something like: ‘this might be a pipe’, or ‘these are not merely interesting colours dominating my field of vision: this is a pipe’. Of course, such a move is not necessarily something we are consciously aware of having made. On the contrary, as Husserl made clear, it can be extremely difficult not to automatically adopt the ‘natural attitude’ according to which our sense perceptions are routinely taken to be things in the world. Nevertheless, to take one thing as something else is to open up the possibility of a mistake. Unlike the pure facticity of the image (or of power), a proposition takes a risk and hence admits of error.

More specifically, a proposition plays precisely with the difference between the actual and the possible that is expressed in the phrase ‘this might be a pipe!’ Aesop’s dog took the risk of such a proposition, and paid the price of error. However, although he lost his piece of meat for one that could not satisfy his hunger, he gained the possibility of a quantum leap in imagination (Whitehead, 1927, p. 19). That is to say, he gained the possibility of an intensification of the contrast that is the difference between the possible and the actual. A proposition thus plays the difference between what is given to us in the mode of causal efficacy and what is given to us in the imagistic mode of presentational immediacy. The most primitive conceptual symbol is the taking of an image as something with the power to otherwise affect and be affected by us (as something that can be eaten, for example). To return to what Magritte shows us, the most primitive conceptual symbol (pipe 3; proposition) is taking the pipe given in presentational immediacy (pipe 2; image) as the causally efficacious pipe that can be smoked (pipe 1; power). Pipe 3 thus literally links the difference between pipes 1 and 2. The first glimpses of consciousness and high-level conceptual thought are born in this difference between image and power. The difference is also the germ of value, and hence the primary issue involved in the art of life. To put it in Spinozist and Deleuzian terms, we take the risk of articulating power and image into a proposition in order to increase our powers (to eat, to think, to love). To put it in Whiteheadian terms, the basic expression of value embodied in a proposition is: ‘Have a care, here is something that matters! Yes – that is the best phrase – the primary glimmering of consciousness reveals, something that matters’ (Whitehead, 1938/1966, p. 116). ‘Importance’ is thus decisive to propositions. More specifically, image derives its importance from its relation with power. The coordination of power and image must take place within the flow of process. Sometimes it matters that ‘this is a pipe’, and sometimes it matters that ‘*ceci n’est pas une pipe*’.

**Pipe 4: enunciation**

A word is clearly not the same kind of thing as an image. However, as with each of our distinctions, it is important to recognise the mutual implication of power, image, proposition and enunciation. As an artist, Magritte amplifies both the similarities and differences between word and image. As Magritte himself put it, ‘Between words and objects one can create new relations and specify characteristics of language and objects generally ignored in everyday life’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 38). For example, the words *Ceci n’est pas une pipe* are not written on the canvas but *painted* on it so as to resemble writing. We are
thus not dealing here with natural handwriting but with a meticulously executed painterly rendition of a natural hand. As such, the sentence is, of course, in the realm of the image. But the writing-image does not resemble a pipe. It is worth further quoting the artist here: ‘In a painting, words are of the same cloth as images. Rather one sees images and words differently in a painting.’ Enunciation thus has an image-aspect (when the spoken word is used it has its perceptual aspect objectified as sound, of course), and it also has a power-aspect. Its most profound links and disjunctures, however, are with the proposition-aspect.

The word pipe is both closest to, and furthest away from the concept pipe. It is closest to it, since once we have learned the meaning of the word, we can take the tight coupling of word and concept for granted. But, nevertheless, word and concept share with image and power the fact that they are connected only via the intermediary of symbolism. In fact, the enunciation (pipe 4) is not the proposition (pipe 3) just as the image (pipe 2) is not the causally efficacious power (pipe 1). As Artaud teaches us so profoundly, the risk that one takes in putting propositions into words is equivalent to the risk entailed in taking an image for the important thing it might stand in place of. But perhaps the risks are worth taking. Certainly once enunciation is possible in a form of life, propositions are forever transformed:

The mentality of mankind and the language of mankind created each other. If we like to assume the rise of language as a given fact, then it is not going too far to say that the souls of men are the gift from language to mankind. The account of the sixth day should be written, He gave them speech, and they became souls. (Whitehead, 1926/1966, p. 41)

Wonder and Wander

We do not wish our pipe mnemonic to be mistaken for an essentialist scheme such that any experience can be boiled down to one of four modes, or such that they are taken as static, clear and distinct categories of experience/expression. It is less a model than an adventure to be had. As we stressed in Chapter 2, reductionist materialism makes a number of problematic assumptions: that some form of stuff or ‘matter’ is the basic foundation of the universe and hence the ultimate ‘reality’; that ultimate reality is meaningless and value free; that there exists a temporally static material base for which development is irrelevant; that real things are ultimately context independent; that creativity is therefore irrelevant to a mechanistic nature, and so forth. We have posited instead that there is nothing more fundamental than activity, events, or actual occasions of experience; that value is of the essence; that the universal is relational and interconnected, that process is the prior concept; and that the universe is a process of creative advance.

One implication of this is that we must contrast reduction downwards with creative evolution upwards. This requires that we be struck with wonder. A pipe, despite certain health risks, can be an impressive aid to adventures of thought, memory and feeling. With a pipe in hand it might be easier to imagine, not a process of moving downwards through epiphenomenal illusion towards an increasingly real and factual base (from communication to consciousness to physiology to physicality, for instance) but rather a move upwards from a scene of pure unrealised potential to scenes of increasingly vivid forms of real experience and expression. One might imagine, for instance, that enunciation, and discourse more generally, presupposes and builds upon proposition, image and power, and that they contain the other modes as an essential aspect of its forms of order. The physical world concerns modifications of energy, and this world thus involves a pure form of power which has nothing to do with image, proposition or enunciation. But it remains a stubborn fact that forms of imagery, conceptual proposition and symbolic communication came into this universe of energy. Basic organic life was able to self-organise in a manner that diverted the flow of that energy, converting it into what might be called the vitality of that which lives, for instance, and living things evolved imagery, and the capacity to propose and to communicate symbolically, presumably through further diversions. We live routinely with the fact of this improbable state of affairs, and yet we rarely wonder at it. Physical worlds of energy, biological worlds of vitality, psychic worlds of ‘personality’ and cultural worlds of communication co-exist with each and every occasion of human existence, and the future awaits us. What potentials can we actualise?

Another implication is that we must wander: we must follow the white whale where it goes. Yes, it is important to conduct controlled research in laboratories, but ‘psychology’ can never be pinned and mounted like a butterfly. If we are to be equal to our subject matter, we must wander as it does, and we must adapt to diverse circumstances as it does. The last thing we need is to live our lives in the laboratories and classrooms of a university psychology department, specialising increasingly on smaller and smaller sub-topics, reading only specialist journals maintained by those who devote their lives to that one narrow area. Too many of our colleagues have ceased to wander and have ceased to wonder. If the discipline of psychology is to grow up then it must shed some of its methodological weapons and some of its disciplinary armour, and it must climb the specialist walls and breathe fresh air. If a naked and vulnerable ape that has wandered the surface of the earth could triumph over the ‘armour plated monsters’ (Whitehead, 1926/2005, p. 258) of prehistory, then there is a glimmer of hope that an undefended second-order psychology might have a future. A tower block needs foundations. Psychology needs a backpack, a pair of good boots, and, of course, a pipe.