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Thomas Jefferson's Account of the Compromise of 1790
Ein zwischen James Madison, Alexander Hamilton und Thomas Jefferson ausgehandelter Kompromiss sollte den Konflikt um den Sitz der zukünftigen Bundeshauptstadt beilegen. So erklärte sich Hamilton bereit, die notwendigen Stimmen im Kongress für einen Hauptstadtsitz am Potomac River zu besorgen, im Austausch gegen Madisons Unterstützung bei der Durchsetzung eines Gesetzes zur Konsolidierung der Schuldenlast der Einzelstaaten. Laut Jefferson, dessen Aufzeichnungen das einzig verbliebene Zeugnis dieses von den Nordstaaten nachträglich als "faulen Handel" bezeichneten Kompromisses sind, soll die Übereinkunft während eines Abendessens in seinem Hause zustande gekommen sein.

 

[…]

Hamilton was in despair. As I was going to the President's one day, I met him in the street. He walked me backwards & forwards before the President's door for half an hour. He painted pathetically the temper into which the legislature had been wrought, the disgust of those who were called the Creditor states, the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the states. He observed that the members of the administration ought to act in concert, that tho' this question was not of my department, yet a common duty should make it a common concern; […] and that the question having been lost by a small majority only, it was probable that an appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of some of my friends might effect a change in the vote, and the machine of government, now suspended, might be again set into motion. I told him that I was really a stranger to the whole subject; not having yet informed myself of the system of finances adopted, I knew not how far this was a necessary sequence; that undoubtedly if it's rejection endangered a dissolution of our union at this incipient stage, I should deem that the most unfortunate of all consequences, to avert which all partial and temporary evils should be yielded. I proposed to him however to dine with me the next day, and I would invite another friend or two, bring them into conference together, and I thought it impossible that reasonable men, consulting together coolly, could fail, by some mutual sacrifices of opinion, to form a compromise which was to save the union. The discussion took place. I could take no part in it, but an exhortatory one, because I was a stranger to the circumstances which should govern it. But it was finally agreed that, whatever importance had been attached to the rejection of this proposition, the preservation of the union, & of concord among the states was more important, and that therefore it would be better that the vote of rejection should be rescinded, to effect which some members should change their votes. But it was observed that this pill would be peculiarly bitter to the Southern States, and that some concomitant measure should be adopted to sweeten it a little to them. There had before been propositions to fix the seat of government either at Philadelphia, or at Georgetown on the Potomac; and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone. So two of the Potomac members (White & Lee, but White with a revulsion of stomach almost convulsive) agreed to change their votes, & Hamilton undertook to carry the other point. In doing this the influence he had established over the Eastern members, with the agency of Robert Morris with those of the middle states, effected his side of the engagement, and so the assumption was passed, and 20 millions of stock divided among favored states, and thrown in as pabulum to the stock-jobbing herd.

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Quelle:
Boyd, Julian P., ed.,
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 17, 6 July to 3 November 1790,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 205-207.