Beliefs are standardly taken to be more or less passive responses to how the world appears to us, while in performing an action, agents change and shape the world, unconsciously or as they intend it to be. A logical investigation of the notion of doxastic agency takes as its starting point the idea that the activity of doxastic subjects has an impact on their belief formation. There clearly are doxastically and epistemically relevant activities, including the drawing of inferences and the active search for information. But how can we formally model belief formation under the assumption that in a certain sense agents could have formed their beliefs otherwise? To which extent are belief formation and belief revision analyzable as the result of doxastic agency? How is evidence to be represented in such a model? The present workshop aims at bringing together researchers working on these and related problems and on reasoning about knowledge in general.
The workshop will take place from 15th-16th December 2017 in the Beckmann's Hof at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany.